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ABSTRACT 
Anchoring effects are remarkably robust and difficult to correct.  Forewarnings 
about the influence of anchor values have not led to a reduction of the anchoring effect 
(Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996).  Overconfidence constitutes a potential reason 
for the failure of forewarnings because it may affect people’s awareness about their 
vulnerability to influences.  As experts are particularly overconfident when making 
judgments (Törngren & Montgomery, 2004), they are expected to be even less responsive 
to forewarnings than non-experts in reducing the magnitude of the anchoring effect.   
In Studies 1 to 3, expertise was operationalized through different experience levels. 
Students either had experience with an anchoring task (e.g., estimation of a flat rent) or 
were unfamiliar with it (e.g., estimation of a company value).  In Study 4, experts 
(management consultants) and non-experts (students) were directly compared while 
performing economic anchoring tasks.  First, half of the participants received an 
overconfidence note (Study 1) or their confidence was reduced by difficult general 
knowledge questions (Studies 2 to 4).  Afterwards, half of the participants received a 
forewarning about the anchoring effect.  As predicted, forewarnings reduced the 
magnitude of anchoring in the low expertise conditions.  More importantly, the magnitude 
of anchoring was also reduced in the high expertise conditions, but only after a confidence 
reduction (Studies 2 to 4), whereas an explicit overconfidence note (Study 1) failed to 
produce the same effect (Study 1).  For management consultants who received a 
forewarning, the effect of the confidence reduction on the magnitude of anchoring was 
mediated by the degree of confidence (Study 4).   
Taken together, higher confidence of experts can explain why expertise impedes 
the effectiveness of forewarnings about anchoring effects.  However, reducing experts’ 
confidence can render a forewarning effective even in the case of high expertise.  
Directions for future research and practical implications are discussed. 
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DEUTSCHE KURZZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Ankereffekte sind robust und schwer zu korrigieren.  Vorwarnungen über den 
Einfluss von Ankerwerten konnten bisher zu keiner Reduktion des Ankereffektes 
führen (Wilson et al., 1996).  Ein möglicher Grund könnte die Überschätzung der 
eigenen Urteilsfähigkeit und damit die Unterschätzung der eigenen Betroffenheit von 
Urteilsheuristiken sein.  Da die Überschätzung der eigenen Urteilsfähigkeiten bei 
Experten besonders ausgeprägt ist (Törngren & Montgomery, 2004), könnte es sein, 
dass Experten den Ankereffekt nach einer Vorwarnung weniger korrigieren als Nicht-
Experten.   
In den Studien 1 bis 3 wurde die Variation von Expertise angestrebt, indem 
Studierende Ankeraufgaben bearbeiten mussten, in denen sie viel (z.B. Schätzung einer 
Wohnungsmiete) oder wenig Erfahrung hatten (z.B. Schätzung des Wertes eines 
Unternehmens).  In Studie 4 wurden Unternehmensberater (Experten) mit Studenten 
(Nicht-Experten) bezüglich Ankeraufgaben mit ökonomischen Inhalten verglichen.  Am 
Anfang der Studien wurde die Hälfte der Probanden auf eine mögliche Überschätzung 
ihrer Urteilsfähigkeit hingewiesen  (Studie 1) oder die Einschätzung ihrer 
Urteilsfähigkeit durch die Bearbeitung von schwierigen Allgemeinwissensaufgaben 
reduziert (Studien 2 bis 4).  Danach erhielt die Hälfte der Probanden vor der 
Bearbeitung der Aufgaben eine Vorwarnung zum Ankereffekt (Studien 1 bis 4).  Wie 
angenommen, konnten Vorwarnungen den Ankereffekt bei geringer Expertise 
reduzieren.  Darüber hinaus war die Vorwarnung auch bei hoher Expertise erfolgreich, 
wenn vorher auch die Einschätzung der Urteilsfähigkeit experimentell reduziert worden 
war (Studien 2 bis 4).  Ein Hinweis über das Risiko der Überschätzung der eigenen 
Urteilsfähigkeit hatte dagegen keinen Effekt (Studie 1).  Für Unternehmensberater in 
der Bedingung mit Vorwarnung konnte gezeigt werden, dass die Wirkung der 
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experimentellen Verringerung der Einschätzung der Urteilsfähigkeit auf das Ausmaß 
des Ankereffektes von der Urteilssicherheit mediiert wurde (Studie 4).  
Insgesamt kann die erhöhte Einschätzung der eigenen Urteilsfähigkeit bei hoher 
Expertise erklären, warum Expertise die Wirksamkeit einer Ankeraufklärung 
vermindert.  Eine experimentelle Verringerung der Einschätzung der Urteilsfähigkeit 
von Experten verhindert diese negativen Auswirkungen von Expertise und macht 
Vorwarnungen auch bei hoher Expertise wirksam.  Praktische Implikationen und sich 
ergebende Richtungen für zukünftige Forschung werden diskutiert. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In 2007, the American housing market bubble burst, triggering the biggest financial 
and economic crisis since World War II.  The seemingly sudden and rapid collapse is often 
compared to a natural disaster, implying the inevitability of this crisis.  However, 
increasing evidence suggests that substantial concerns did previously exist regarding 
complicated financial products and the exaggerations of the prices in the U.S. housing 
market (Rajan, 2005; Shiller, 2006; Taleb, 2006).  Indeed, analyses in the aftermath of the 
crisis revealed that expert decision makers were explicitly warned about the upcoming 
disaster.  For example, economist Nouriel Roubini presented his prognoses at a conference 
of the International Monetary Fund in Washington in 2006: He predicted a breakdown of 
the U.S. real estate market, trillions of dollars in bad mortgage loans, and collapses of 
banks and hedge funds (Roubini, 2010).  These forewarnings almost perfectly predicted 
the allegedly unforeseeable events.  
In line with the ignorance of the markets, psychological research has demonstrated 
that decision makers often fail to benefit from forewarnings about biases, such as, the halo 
effect (Wetzel, Wilson, & Kort, 1981), the overconfidence effect (Armor, 1999), and the 
anchoring effect (Wilson et al., 1996).  The latter, which denotes the assimilation of 
numerical judgments under uncertainty towards a given numerical standard, is a 
particularly robust bias (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999) and 
cannot be reduced by forewarnings (Wilson et al., 1996).  At the same time, it occurs in 
many essential real-life settings such as negotiations (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), 
product purchase (Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000), or in the courtroom (Englich, 
2006; Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2005).  It therefore seems particularly important to 
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investigate why anchoring remains largely unaffected by forewarnings and to find ways to 
improve the effectiveness of these forewarnings.   
In a study by Wilson et al. (1996), participants were forewarned about the 
anchoring effect.  These forewarnings were unable to reduce the anchoring effect, even 
though they were given just before the anchoring task and included an example similar to 
the task itself.  Why were these forewarnings about anchoring so stunningly ineffective, 
just like the alarming signs before the financial crisis?  The failure to correct the anchoring 
effect by a forewarning was explained by the participants’ belief that their own judgments 
were less biased than those of others (Wilson et al., 1996, p. 398).  The forewarning 
proved to be successful in convincing participants that people in general are susceptible to 
anchoring effects, but they were not willing to assume bias in their own judgments.  In 
short, participants considered themselves immune to the anchoring effect. 
As important decisions are often made by experts in their specific domain, it is 
highly relevant to consider the impact forewarnings may have on their decision making 
process.  On the one hand, there are reasons to believe that experts may debias more 
effectively, for instance, they typically have access to more anchor-inconsistent 
information (c.f., Englich, 2008), which can reduce anchoring effects (Mussweiler et al., 
2000).  On the other hand, it has been shown that experts are often particularly 
overconfident (e.g., Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Törngren & Montgomery, 2004; 
Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994).  If, as Wilson et al. (1996) suppose, overestimating the 
validity of one’s own judgments is, in fact, the reason why forewarnings fail, expertise 
may affect debiasing more negatively than positively.  For example, a professional 
investor, whose investing decisions are biased by past stock prices (Mussweiler & 
Schneller, 2003), could be overconfident about his decisions because of his high expertise 
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level.  He might therefore leave this bias uncorrected, despite being forewarned about the 
anchoring effect.  As it can be seen in this example, the effects of expertise on debiasing 
attempts are of practical importance.  Nevertheless, this issue has so far not been examined 
in the context of anchoring or other cognitive biases.  
To elaborate my hypotheses in a more detailed manner, I will first provide a short 
overview of the robustness of the anchoring effect and the effectiveness of debiasing measures 
in different types of anchoring.  This is followed by an introduction of the concept of 
overconfidence and a description of the risk that overconfidence may entail for the success of 
debiasing measures.  Finally, I will discuss the particular role that overconfidence may occupy 
in high-expertise settings. 
 
The robustness of anchoring  
Numerical standards (anchors) can assimilate estimations of unknown quantities 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  This phenomenon is called the anchoring effect.  It is best 
illustrated by a prominent example: In the classical study by Tversky and Kahnemann 
(1974), participants estimated the percentage of African countries in the United Nations 
(UN), which was influenced by a number which was generated by a wheel of fortune.  
First, participants were asked a comparative question, that is, whether the percentage of 
African nations in the UN is higher or lower than an anchor (65% vs. 10%), which had 
obviously been picked by spinning a wheel of fortune.  In a subsequent absolute anchoring 
question, participants gave their estimate of this percentage.  These absolute judgments 
were significantly assimilated towards the random number; hence, the mean estimation of 
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participants who had obtained the high anchor was 45%, as compared to 25% for 
participants who had obtained the low anchor. 
Such demonstrations of the anchoring effect under the controlled conditions of a 
laboratory are abundant (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; 
Janiszewski & Uy, 2008; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a).  Additionally, the practical 
implications of the anchoring effect have also been demonstrated in numerous real-life 
settings (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Kaustia, Alho, & 
Puttonen, 2008; LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2009; Mussweiler et al., 2000; Northcraft & Neale, 
1987; Stewart, 2009).  For example, in face-to-face and E-mail negotiations, the party that 
set an anchor by making the first offer received a better outcome (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 
2001; Ritov, 1996).  Moreover, first offers were strong predictors of counteroffers and 
final settlement prices (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001).  However, the anchoring effect not 
only affects judgments of non-experts, but also those of experienced judicial experts, who 
let their sentencing decisions be guided by random numbers (Englich et al., 2005, 2006; 
Englich & Soder, 2009).  The same is the case for real estate agents whose estimations of a 
property value were biased by manipulated listing prices (Northcraft & Neale, 1987).  
Anchoring is also one of the most robust cognitive biases (Chapman & Johnson, 
1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999).  It occurs even if the anchor values are irrelevant for 
the absolute estimate, because they were obviously selected at random (e.g., Englich et al., 
2006; Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Additionally, anchoring is not mitigated by extreme and implausible anchors (e.g., 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2001a; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997).  For example, estimates of the 
annual mean temperature in the Antarctic were assimilated to both an unreasonably high 
anchor value of 700 °C and to a plausible high anchor value of -17 °C (Mussweiler & 
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Strack, 2001a).  Moreover, anchoring effects persist over time.  In a study conducted by 
Mussweiler (2001), anchoring effects still appeared one week after the anchor value had 
been considered.  Probably the most striking evidence of the robustness of this 
phenomenon, however, stems from research using anchors which are presented 
incidentally (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008) or even outside the participant’s awareness 
(Mussweiler & Englich, 2005; Reitsma-van Rooijen & Daamen, 2006).  For example, high 
or low anchor values influenced participants asked to evaluate the cost of an average 
German car even when they were presented subliminally while participants worked out 
their estimations (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005).  Even a coincidental number displayed on 
athletes’ jerseys has proved to bias the judgments of their performance (Critcher & 
Gilovich, 2008).  As we are almost constantly surrounded by random numbers, as in 
advertisements, media, or public signs, one might conclude that anchors affect most 
numerical estimations. 
 
Debiasing of the anchoring effect: Distinctions, mechanisms, and 
methods 
There is wide agreement across different psychological and non-psychological 
disciplines (economics, law, educational science) that human thinking and decision 
making are not as rational as once commonly postulated (Dawes, 2001; Kahnemann & 
Tversky, 1996; Simon 1955, 1957; Stanovich & West, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Many cognitive biases have been discovered – Krueger and Funder (2004) list 42 biases in 
their review – and there is a vast body of research on moderators and processes.  In 
remarkable contrast to the abundant research on cognitive biases in human judgment, 
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debiasing has been a relatively neglected empirical issue (cf., Arkes, 1991; Larrick, 2004; 
Petty & Wegener, 1993).  Furthermore, researchers have made far more progress in 
cataloging cognitive biases than in discovering ways to correct or prevent them (Lilienfeld, 
Amirati, & Landfield, 2009).  Accordingly, the terms "debias" or "debiasing" only yield 
128 references in a PsychINFO search (June 24, 2011) – compared to 4,835 references for 
the terms "cognitive bias" or "cognitive biases".  As discussed by Lilienfeld et al. (2009), 
psychology could make a valuable contribution to society by developing effective and 
applicable debiasing measures.  
With regard to the considerable practical implications (Chapman & Bornstein, 
1996; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Kaustia, Alho, & Puttonen, 2008; Mussweiler et al., 
2000; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Stewart, 2009) and the perseverance of the anchoring 
effect (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999), it seems particularly 
important to find effective methods of reducing it.  However, presenting solutions to 
reduce this bias is complicated by the fact that anchoring effects seem to be multifaceted.  
Empirical evidence suggests that different types of anchoring effects exist.  Even more 
importantly for my research, the effectiveness of different debiasing methods varies 
depending on the type of anchoring effect considered (Englich, 2008; Epley & Gilovich, 
2001, 2004, 2005, 2006).  
The first important distinction is based on the degree of attention directed to the 
anchor value.  Standard anchoring effects involve paradigms in which the person devotes 
some thought to the anchor value.  Typically, participants are asked to give a comparative 
judgment about the target quantity, followed by an absolute judgment.  In the above-
mentioned study by Tversky and Kahnemann (1974), they were first asked whether the 
percentage of African nations in the UN is higher or lower than a presented anchor 
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(comparative judgment) and then gave their best estimates of the value (absolute 
judgment).  Basic anchoring effects, on the other hand, involve paradigms with no direct 
comparison of anchor and target (e.g., Wilson et al., 1996, Study 3).  For example, Wilson 
et al. (1996, Study 3) asked judges to copy either five pages of high numbers or five pages 
of irrelevant words before giving their judgments.  In the subsequent estimation task, 
writing high numbers resulted in higher estimates.  Basic anchoring is the most fragile 
type of anchoring (Brewer & Chapman, 2002) and can be reduced by knowledge (Englich, 
2008).  Therefore, in my attempt to reduce anchoring effects I focus on the more persistent 
standard anchoring effects in order to make a stronger point for my hypotheses. 
A second important categorization differentiates between anchoring paradigms 
with externally provided anchors and self-generated anchors.  In the externally provided 
anchoring paradigm, the anchors are explicitly (e.g., Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974) or 
implicitly (e.g., Wilson et al., 1996) provided by the experimenter, before participants 
make their absolute estimate.  In the self-generated anchors paradigm, the comparative 
standards are generated by the participants themselves (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2004, 
2005, 2006).  For example, in this paradigm, participants are asked to estimate the freezing 
point of vodka.  It is assumed that they start out with a self-generated anchor of 0°C as the 
freezing point of water and then adjust downwards knowing that the freezing point of 
alcohol is lower (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2006).   
The anchoring effect can be reduced either by general debiasing strategies like 
forewarnings or incentives (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2005, 2006; Wilson et al.; 1996) or 
by interventions which use research about specific processes to debias (e.g., Mussweiler et 
al., 2000; Simmons, LeBoeuf, & Nelson, 2010).  Additionally, different explanations for 
the anchoring effect predict different general debiasing strategies to be successful. 
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Therefore, it is important to be aware of the processes which explain the anchoring 
effect.  To date, six explanations have been proposed to account for the anchoring effect: 
(1) conversational inferences, (2) numerical priming, (3) insufficient adjustment, (4) scale 
distortion, (5) selective accessibility, and (6) elaboration-based view of anchoring.  The 
following sections elaborate further on these explanations. 
  
Conversational inferences 
According to the account of conversational inferences, participants who anticipate 
the experimenter to be maximally informative (Grice, 1975) may assume that the provided 
anchor value is close to the true value and consequently assimilate their estimation to it 
(Jacowitz & Kahnemann, 1995; Schwarz, 1994).  
Numerical priming 
A second account proposes that anchoring effects are purely numeric (Jacowitz & 
Kahneman, 1995; Wilson et al., 1996; Wong & Kwong, 2000).  According to this 
approach, an anchoring task simply makes the anchor value more accessible, so that this 
value is likely to influence the subsequent absolute judgment (Mussweiler, Englich, & 
Strack, 2004).   
Insufficient adjustment 
The anchoring and adjustment hypothesis describes anchoring as a process by 
which people anchor on a given standard and then adjust their initial judgment until they 
reach the boundary of plausible values for the estimate (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  The 
extent of adjustment may still be insufficient.  For example, participants who are asked to 
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estimate the freezing point of vodka, may use a value of 0 °C as a starting point.  Then 
they may determine whether this value is too low or too high, and assimilate in the 
appropriate direction until the first plausible – but not necessarily correct – value is found. 
Scale Distortion 
The scale distortion theory explains anchoring by a shift in the use of the response 
scale (Frederick & Mochon, 2011).  The underlying representation of the judgment target 
is assumed to remain stable.  Accordingly, it should be of no relevance if the targets in the 
comparative versus the absolute question are identical or not.  For instance, absolute 
estimations of the weight of an adult wolf are assimilated towards the anchor, irrespective 
of whether the comparative question contains a wolf or a sea turtle as comparative 
standard (Frederick & Mochon, 2011).   
Selective accessibility 
The selective accessibility model (SAM) of anchoring (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999, 
2001b; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; for a related account, see Chapman & Johnson, 1994, 
1999) proposes that anchoring is essentially a knowledge accessibility effect.  It involves 
two fundamental principles: (1) hypothesis-consistent testing and (2) semantic priming.  
Similar to the process of hypothesis-consistent testing, the model assumes that the 
comparison of the target to the anchor value in a comparative question changes the 
accessibility of knowledge about the target.  More specifically, the accessibility of anchor-
consistent knowledge is selectively increased.  In line with this theory, asking whether 
more or less than 10% of the UN nations are African would lead participants to evaluate 
this option as if it were the true value.  In doing so, they selectively activate knowledge 
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that is consistent with this assumption and thereby allow the anchor to exert its influence. 
(e.g., “Asia is far bigger than Africa”). 
Elaboration-based view of anchoring 
The previously presented explanations are mostly not seen as mutually exclusive, 
but as complementary (Mussweiler et al., 2004; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999, 2000; Wilson 
et al., 1996).  
An attempt to combine different accounts explaining anchoring in one coherent 
theory has been recently made (Wegener, Petty, Blankenship, & Detweiler-Bedell, 
2010a)
1
.  It was proposed that anchors can adopt multiple roles (Blankenship et al., 2008; 
Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell, & Jarvis, 2001).  More precisely, the anchoring effect 
may result from relatively thoughtful processes (high elaboration) in some cases, and from 
relatively non-thoughtful processes (low elaboration) in others.  According to persuasion 
theories (see Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953), high elaboration is defined as an inspection 
of judgment-relevant information in light of existing knowledge and beliefs (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1984).  With respect to the domain of anchoring, particularly the processes 
proposed by the SAM (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) are seen 
as highly elaborative.  In low elaboration settings, conversational inferences and numerical 
priming have been proposed as the mechanisms at work (Wegener et al., 2010). 
 
 
                                                 
 
1
 For a discussion of this account see Epley & Gilovich, 2010; Russo, 2010; Frederick, Kahnemann, & 
Mochon, 2010; Wegener, Petty, Blankenship, & Detweiler-Bedell, 2010b. 
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Specific debiasing strategies 
As descibed above, some debiasing measures use these explanations to derive 
specific debiasing strategies.  For example, the SAM predicts that anchoring is caused by 
the increased accessibility of anchor-consistent information.  An activation of anchor-
inconsistent information should therefore reduce the anchoring effect.  Mussweiler et al. 
(2004) tested and confirmed this hypothesis.  In the study, car mechanics were approached 
and asked for the price of a 10-year-old-car.  Then they were informed about the estimate 
of the client himself – the anchor value (“I thought that the car should sell for about 
2,800/5,000 Marks”, Mussweiler et al., 2000, p. 1143).  If participants were then asked to 
list arguments against this price, the anchoring effect was significantly reduced.   
General debiasing strategies 
The SAM and the insufficient adjustment account also make diverging predictions 
about the success of general debiasing strategies (e.g., forewarnings, incentives) (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2001, 2005, 2006; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999).  While the extent of an 
insufficient adjustment should vary by the amount of effortful thinking, the increased 
accessibility of anchor-consistent information should be independent of it.  In an externally 
provided anchors setting, the predictions of the SAM found broad empirical support (e.g., 
Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2005; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974; 
Wilson et al., 1996).  Anchoring effects could not be reduced by forewarnings (Wilson et 
al., 1996; Epley & Gilovich, 2005), incentives (Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley & 
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Gilovich, 2005)
2
 or time pressure (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999).  In contrast, in a self-
generated anchors setting forewarnings and incentives (e.g., financial incentives) reduced 
the effect of self-generated anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006). 
The different results of forewarnings and incentives concerning externally provided 
or self-generated anchors are explained by the degree of automaticity in information 
processing (Epley & Gilovich, 2005, 2006).  Self-generated anchors serve as starting 
points, but then undergo effortful and deliberate adjustment until the value seems right.  In 
contrast, the process of knowledge activation through externally provided anchors tends to 
be largely automatic and is therefore unlikely to be affected by deliberate thought (Epley 
& Gilovich, 2005, 2006).  
An alternative explanation for these different results concerning self-generated and 
externally provided anchors has recently been discussed (Simmons et al., 2010).  Whereas 
people know the direction of the adjustment from a self-generated anchor, they are less 
certain about the direction of adjustment from an externally provided anchor.  They often 
believe that their initial adjustment was too far from the externally provided anchors and 
reduce their adjustment if they are asked to reconsider their judgments (Simmons et al., 
2010).  In support of this reasoning, Simmons et al. (2010) showed that incentives also 
increase adjustment from externally provided anchors if participants are certain about the 
direction of adjustment (Studies 2, 3a, 3b, & 5). 
                                                 
 
2
 A different result was found in the study of Wright & Anderson (1989), where a marginally 
significant reduction due to incentives was found. Additionally, incentives reduce the anchoring effect if 
people are certain about the direction of adjustment (Simmons, LeBoeuf, & Nelson, 2010). 
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In this dissertation, I propose an additional, slightly different explanation, which 
focuses on the degree of awareness of the necessity of adjustment.  An adjustment to the 
boundary of plausible values makes sense only if the anchor value falls outside the range 
of plausible values (Mussweiler et al., 2004).  A value may be implausible for a participant 
because it is absurdly extreme, or because it is known to be incorrect.  In a self-generated 
anchors setting, judges are aware that they have to adjust away from the anchor because 
they know – from the beginning – that the self-generated anchor is not the correct answer 
(Epley & Gilovich, 2001).  For example, participants who self-generate the freezing point 
of water as an anchor in order to estimate the freezing point of vodka probably know that 
0°C is an implausible value (Mussweiler et al., 2004).  As a consequence, the anchoring 
and adjustment account is particularly applicable to explain anchoring in self-generated 
anchors paradigms.  In contrast, externally provided anchors have to be considered the 
correct answer, even if only for a moment (Epley & Gilovich, 2001).  Judges are hence not 
necessarily aware of the need to correct their judgments away from the randomly 
determined anchors.  
Additionally, judges may also be less conscious of the necessity to correct 
externally provided anchors, because it can be aversive to accept a random external 
influence on one’s own judgments.  For judges who consider themselves to be rational 
decision makers, being biased by random numbers (e.g., Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974) or 
receiving advice from obviously incompetent counselors (e.g., Mussweiler et al, 2000) 
constitutes a self-esteem threat.  Even if forewarned, people may therefore deny their own 
susceptibility to the anchoring effect because of their overconfident belief to be immune to 
bias.  As an empirical support of this reasoning, participants expect others to be more 
prone to the anchoring effect than they themselves are (Wilson et al., 1996).   
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If these considerations are correct and overconfidence is in fact the reason why 
forewarnings are not successful in reducing the effect of externally provided anchors, 
forewarnings should be more effective if confidence is reduced. 
 
Overconfidence as a risk for debiasing  
Overconfidence (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1977) comprises three subtypes 
(Moore & Healy, 2008).  The first and best-researched (Moore & Swift, 2011) subtype is 
overestimation.  People subjectively perceive that their own performance is better than it 
really is.  For example, marketing students overestimate their performance on academic 
exams (Clayson, 2005), or investors overestimate the quality of their own investment 
decisions (Moore, Kurtzberg, Fox, & Bazerman, 1999).  The second type of 
overconfidence is overprecision.  People are excessively certain about the accuracy of their 
estimations.  In knowledge tasks, for example, they choose too narrow confidence intervals 
when asked to determine an upper and a lower bound of their answers (Klayman, Soll, 
Gonzalez-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Soll & Klayman, 2004).  The third type is called 
overplacement (Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007).  People regard themselves as better than 
they really are if they compare themselves to others.  For example, the majority of 
American and Swedish students think that they are far more skillful and less risky drivers 
than the average driver (Svenson, 1981).  About 88% of the US student group and 77% of 
the Swedish group believed themselves to be safer drivers than the median, which is 
objectively statistically impossible. 
The overplacement subtype of the overconfidence bias, in particular, appears to be 
related to people’s conviction that they are less vulnerable to the anchoring effect than 
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others (c.f., Wilson et al., 1996).  The gap between accepting that cognitive biases 
generally exist while denying that people themselves are affected by them has also been 
discovered for other biases and is called the bias blind spot (Kruger & Gilovich, 1999; 
Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross 2004; Pronin & Kugler, 2007).  The bias blind spot is defined as 
the bias of seeing oneself as less susceptible to biases than others (Pronin & Kugler, 2007; 
Pronin, 2008).  People accept the general fact that cognitive biases are skewing human 
judgments – but they underestimate the impact of biases on their own behavior.   
 Negative effects of overconfidence on debiasing measures have already been 
shown in different domains.  For example, overconfidence in the quality of intuitive 
judgments contributes to the reluctance to use helpful actuarial judgment aids (Sieck & 
Arkes, 2005).  Like decision aids, forewarnings are also an external support which can be 
used or neglected depending on the level of overconfidence.  As overconfidence is a 
ubiquitous phenomenon (Plous, 1995; Moore & Swift, 2011) and there is no apparent 
reason to believe that these negative effects of overconfidence are unique to the domain of 
decision aids, it seems logical to assume that overconfidence may undermine the 
effectiveness of an anchoring forewarning. 
 If this reasoning is true, a reduction of overconfidence should make an anchoring 
forewarning more effective.  A reduction of overconfidence has often been shown to be 
difficult (Armor, 1999; Sharp, Cutler, & Penrod, 1988; Sieck & Arkes, 2005, Studies 1 & 
2) and the success of various techniques is often restricted to a specific context (cf., 
Fischhoff, 1982).  Nevertheless, a successful reduction of overconfidence has been 
accomplished by calibration feedback (e.g., Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980; Sieck & 
Arkes, 2005, Study 3), considering the opposite (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980), 
difficult tasks at the beginning of the study (Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994), anticipation of a 
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group discussion (Arkes, Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, 1987, Study 2), or asking 
participants seemingly “easy” questions which were actually more difficult and giving 
them feedback about the correct responses (Arkes et al., 1987, Study 2).  In the latter 
study, participants were asked general knowledge questions which appeared to be easy but 
contained hidden difficulties.  For instance, participants were asked which country is 
larger, Greenland or Great Britain.  For several reasons, such as, for example, Great Britain 
is more available for participants (availability bias) or more populated (halo effect), 
participants gave incorrect responses, hardly doubting the correctness of their responses.  
After receiving feedback about the correct solution, these participants were less 
overconfident than participants in the control condition without hidden difficulties (Arkes 
et al., 1987, Study 2). 
 
Experts – particularly confident  
The decisions which led to the financial crisis were made by experts in their fields.  
As described above, politicians and managers did not react to forewarnings (Rajan, 2005; 
Shiller, 2006; Taleb, 2006).  Was this a singular event, or are experts in general less 
receptive to forewarnings?  This question is all the more important, because a lot of far 
reaching decisions in our society are made by experts.  Politicians and managers are 
responsible for decisions which can cause wars (recently in Afghanistan or Iraq) or 
maximum credible accidents (recently in Fukushima).  In everyday life, managers, doctors, 
and judges constantly face countless important decisions. 
It seems reasonable that expertise has detrimental effects on the different stages of 
the debiasing process (Wilson & Brekke, 1994), as depicted in Figure 1.  On the one hand, 
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it is plausible to assume that experts should be able to correct for judgmental biases like 
the anchoring effect more effectively than non-experts for several reasons.  First, experts 
know more about the target and should therefore have more anchor-inconsistent 
information at their disposal (cf., Englich, 2008).  As the consideration of anchor-
inconsistent information can reduce anchoring effects (Blankenship, Petty, Detweiler-
Bedell, & Macey, 2008; Mussweiler et al., 2000), experts might more often overcome its 
influence.  Second, in light of the insufficient adjustment approach (Epley & Gilovich, 
2001, 2004, 2005, 2006), experts might consider a narrower boundary of plausible 
responses and thus move further away from the anchor.  Third, experts may also be more 
aware of the direction and magnitude of a potential bias due to their broader and more 
profound knowledge in their specific domain of expertise.  According to Wilson and 
Brekke (1994) and Simmons et al. (2010), these are important pre-requisites for successful 
correction.  As a consequence, experts might correct more easily. 
 
Figure 1: According to the presented reasoning, the process of mental contamination and mental 
correction (adapted from Wilson & Brekke, 1994) is disturbed by overconfidence in the stage of 
awareness about the unwanted processing. 
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On the other hand, psychological research suggests that experts are often as 
vulnerable to cognitive biases as non-experts (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; Englich et al., 
2005, 2006; Mussweiler et al., 2000; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Whyte & Sebenius, 1997). 
Additionally, expertise has been shown to increase certainty about one’s judgment, but 
leave bias undiminished (Englich et al., 2006; Törngren & Montgomery, 2004; Trafimow 
& Sniezek, 1994)
3
.  For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) let real estate agents and 
students estimate the value of a property.  Although experts were equally biased by the 
anchoring effect in their professional domain as laymen, they were less aware of the 
biasing influences.  In a similar vein, people have been shown to be more overconfident 
for tasks when they possess a self-declared expertise (Heath & Tversky, 1990), but their 
overconfidence decreases for tasks where they regard themselves as incompetent (Kruger, 
1999).  If somebody is convinced about the correctness of his decisions, she or he will 
probably be less aware of the fact that undesired and irrational influences interfere to a 
significant degree.  It is therefore likely that experts are ignorant of their own susceptibility 
to biases, which is an important precondition for debiasing (Wilson & Brekke, 1994), see 
Figure 1.   
In a related context, Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen (1986) explored the role of 
overconfidence and expertise in decision aid neglect.  They first recorded participants’ 
self-assessed knowledge about baseball rules, and then asked them to indicate which one 
out of three baseball players had won the Most Valuable Player (MVP) award.  The 
researchers provided participants with the most important information for each player in 
                                                 
 
3
 For diverging results see Mckenzie, Liersch, & Yaniv, 2008. In a task that asked participants to 
estimate confidence intervals, experts estimated narrower intervals but the intervals were also nearer to the 
true values and therefore more often contained the true value. Thus, there was no net effect of hit rate and 
overconfidence. 
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the respective year.  They also introduced them to a useful decision rule.  Those 
participants who scored poorly on the quiz relied more on the decision rule during the 
MVP selection task, and so significantly outperformed the more experienced "baseball 
experts".  The "expert" group, however, was more confident about their performance on 
the task.  These results suggest that the "expert" group’s overconfidence lowered their 
reliance on the aid, and thus impaired their decision quality.  Although a decision aid is not 
entirely comparable to a forewarning, this result suggests that experts are more resistant 
than non-experts against embracing the potential benefits of external support in the form of 
a forewarning.  
Taken together, experts typically feel more confident about their judgments than 
laymen do, while in reality they are often just as strongly affected by biases.  By refusing 
to accept their own susceptibility to bias, they are likely to profit less from forewarnings.   
 
The Current Research 
The primary objective of the here presented studies is to determine the main pre-
conditions which hinder or facilitate the correction of the anchoring effect.  More 
precisely, they are designed to show that these pre-conditions differ systematically for 
experts and non-experts.  As outlined above, experts tend to be particularly overconfident 
about their decisions and estimates (e.g., Englich et al., 2006; Törngren & Montgomery, 
2004; Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994).  As a consequence, experts should be less responsive to 
a forewarning about the anchoring effect compared to non-experts and therefore correct 
the anchoring effect less after this forewarning than non-experts.  In order to show that 
overconfidence is indeed the reason of experts’ unsuccessful bias correction after a 
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forewarning, different confidence reduction methods are utilized in some of the 
experimental conditions.  If the here presented reasoning is right, these confidence 
reductions should enable experts to correct for the anchoring effect after a forewarning.   
Taken together, drawing on the example of experts’ decision making, the following 
studies are designed to demonstrate that heightened confidence is a crucial factor that may 
hinder decision makers to eliminate anchoring effects after being forewarned.  
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Study 1 
In Study 1, based on a student sample, experience was used as a proxy for expertise 
(c.f., Arkes et al., 1986; Hinds, 1999; for an overview, see Chi, 2006).  Two estimation 
tasks were implemented as the main dependent variables: One task was closely related to 
students’ everyday life, while participants were far less experienced with the other task.   
Because of increased confidence in the high experience task, a forewarning about 
the anchoring effect was expected not to be effective, whereas it should be effective in the 
less familiar task.  As a test of whether confidence is indeed the critical variable which 
moderates the effectiveness of an anchoring forewarning, confidence levels were varied.  
This was achieved by informing some participants about people’s tendency to be 
overconfident about their own performance.  
To test the above-mentioned hypotheses, a 2 (expertise: high vs. low) x 2 
(overconfidence note: overconfidence note vs. no overconfidence note) x 2 (forewarning: 
forewarning vs. no forewarning) x 2 (anchor: low vs. high) mixed design with expertise as 
a within-factor and confidence reduction, forewarning, and anchor as between-factors was 
applied. 
Method 
Procedure 
After being instructed to turn off their cell-phones and to follow the instructions 
carefully, participants were asked to complete a computer-based questionnaire in a 
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laboratory on the university campus.  The questionnaire was designed using Unipark EFS 
Survey.  Its four parts were administered in the following order:  The note about people’s 
tendency to be overconfident (for half of the participants), the anchoring forewarning (for 
half of the participants), two estimation tasks containing externally provided numerical 
standards (anchors) in a standard anchoring paradigm, and a few additional self-report 
questions.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions resulting 
from the three between-factors, namely overconfidence note, forewarning, and anchor.  
Additionally, the order of the two estimation tasks (high vs. low expertise task) was 
counterbalanced across participants to avoid order effects.  After finishing, all participants 
were thanked, debriefed, and given a chocolate bar as compensation.  
Materials  
Expertise.  As experience served as a proxy for expertise (c.f., Arkes et al., 1986; 
Hinds, 1999; for an overview see Chi, 2006), each participant worked on one task 
involving a familiar topic and another task in which low levels of experience could be 
assumed.  In the following, these tasks are denoted as high and low expertise tasks, 
because expertise is the concept which should be approximated by experience.  In one 
task, the student participants were asked to estimate the rent of a specific shared flat in 
Cologne.  The most important characteristics determining the monthly rent of this shared 
flat in Cologne (e.g., living space, location) were provided.  Due to the fact that most 
students in Cologne live in shared flats, and the monthly flat rent comprises the major part 
of their income, they should be experienced in estimating adequate rental rates.  The low 
expertise task consisted of estimating the value of a company.  Again, the most important 
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characteristics (e.g., turnover, industry cluster, etc.) needed to properly estimate the 
company's value were given.  As student participants are rarely engaged in this type of 
estimation, their expertise for this task should be low.   
Overconfidence note.  Half of the participants received the following note which 
aimed at reducing confidence concerning their own decisions: "Numerous studies have 
shown that judgments and estimates are systematically biased by undesired influences.  
Even among well-educated and intelligent people, these influences can lead to deviations 
from purely rational and objective judgments and estimations.  Typically, judges 
themselves do not notice these influences.  This is because the extent of undesired 
influences is systematically underestimated and one’s own capability to make objective 
decisions is systematically overestimated.  Even if people know about such a bias, they 
often think that only other people are biased, but neglect their own vulnerability to the 
bias.  This results in overrating the accuracy of one’s own judgments and estimates." 
Anchoring forewarning.  Half of the participants received an explicit anchoring 
forewarning.  Similar to the study by Wilson et al. (1996), the anchoring forewarning 
comprised an explanation and an illustrative example of the anchoring affect: "A well-
known bias which frequently affects judgments and estimations is the anchoring effect.  
Anchoring means that a predetermined random number can serve as an anchor and can 
influence estimations of unknown quantities.  The anchoring effect has been demonstrated 
in a broad variety of judgmental domains and under various conditions.  For example, in a 
famous study on anchoring effects, the estimate of the percentage of African countries in 
the UN was influenced by an obviously random number generated by spinning a wheel of 
fortune.  A high value on the wheel of fortune resulted in a higher estimation of the 
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number of African states in the UN, whereas a lower value on the Wheel of Fortune led to 
a lower estimation." 
Anchor.  After providing them with the most important facts about the shared flat 
in Cologne (high expertise) and the company value (low expertise) respectively, 
participants were asked two subsequent questions, corresponding to the standard anchoring 
paradigm: First, they were asked to estimate whether the real value was lower, just right or 
higher than a randomly generated anchor ("Is this number too low, exactly correct, or too 
high?").  Second, they were requested to provide their absolute estimate on the given task.  
All participants completed both estimation tasks.  The high and low anchor values were 
chosen on the basis of a pretest in which a comparable group of student participants (n = 
59) gave estimates for the target quantities.  High anchors were set at the 85th percentile of 
pre-test estimates, and correspondingly, low anchors were set at the 15th percentile.  
Resulting from the pretest, in the high expertise estimation task (shared flat rent), half of 
the participants received a high anchor (420 €), whereas the other half received a low 
anchor (220 €).  Similarly, in the low expertise estimation task (company value 
estimation), half of the participants received a high anchor (22,000 million €), the other 
half received a low anchor (400 million €).  The order of the tasks was randomized. 
Additional measures.  To verify the effectiveness of the expertise manipulation, 
participants indicated their subjective expertise in the estimates after each estimation task 
on the following dimensions: The lowest and highest conceivable values for an adequate 
estimate, subjectively perceived judgment certainty, thoroughness of the estimation, and 
personal judgment quality compared to other participants’ estimates.  Moreover, at the end 
of the experiment, participants answered a short questionnaire intended to determine 
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whether the overconfidence note changed attention to the anchoring forewarning.  First, 
participants answered five questions about the anchoring instruction and the awareness 
about the anchoring effect: familiarity with the anchoring effect before the experiment, 
comprehensibility of the forewarning, personal influenceability by the anchoring effect, 
attitude towards being affected by anchoring effects, and consideration of the anchoring 
forewarning while making the estimates.  Finally, participants rated their mood and 
alertness, and answered questions about specific incidents during the experiment as well as 
their demographic data.   
Participants 
83 participants (47 female, MAge = 23.5 years, SDAge = 3.15 years) were recruited 
by approaching them on the university campus and asking them to take part in a study 
containing estimation tasks.  To ensure a low expertise level for the low expertise task 
(estimation of a company value), students of economics and financial mathematics were 
excluded from participation.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
experimental conditions.  Due to excessive acoustic disturbance or deficient understanding 
of the instructions, four participants (5 %) were excluded from further analyses. 
Results  
Manipulation check 
Expertise.  As previously supposed, the participants felt more confident in the high 
expertise task.  The difference between the lowest and highest value which participants 
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considered a possible estimate was significantly wider in the low expertise estimation task
4
 
(M = 1.52, SD = 2.61) than in the low expertise task (M = 0.38, SD = 0.22), 
t(1, 78) = 3.78, p < .001, reflecting less certainty about the correct value.  Furthermore, 
participants indicated (all scales ranging from 1 to 9) that they felt more certain in the high 
expertise condition (M = 6.00, SD = 1.32)  than in the high expertise condition (M = 3.09, 
SD = 1.70), t(1, 78) = 12.32, p < .001), rated their estimations as more thorough [Ms = 
6.11 and 4.86, SDs = 1.43 and 1.38, t(1, 78) = 7.07, p < .001], and estimated their 
performance superior in comparison to the average peer [Ms = 56.34 % and 37.67 % in 
percentages, SDs = 17.05 and 18.35, t(1, 78) = 7.12, p < .001].   
 Overconfidence note.  The overconfidence note did not have any significant effects 
on the self-report measures at the end of the study (consideration of the anchoring 
forewarning while forming one’s own estimates, influenceability by the anchoring effect, 
attitude towards being affected by anchoring effects, mood, alertness), ts < 1.2. 
Magnitude of the anchoring effect  
In line with common practice, the standardized absolute estimates of the flat rent 
and the company value were analyzed (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2005, 2006; Strack & 
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 The difference between the lowest and highest value considered a possible estimate for each 
participant were divided by their estimates, to correct for the higher absolute values in the low expertise task.  
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Mussweiler, 1997) and corrected for outliers (van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1993)
5
.  In the high 
anchor condition, higher z-values stand for stronger anchoring effects, whereas in the low 
anchor condition, higher z-values stand for weaker anchoring effects.  For this reason, the 
z-values in the low anchor estimation tasks were reversed
6
.  As a consequence, it was 
possible to aggregate the values across the high and low anchor conditions.  To test my 
hypotheses, the standardized values of both estimations were submitted as repeated 
measures to a 2 (expertise: high vs. low) x 2 (overconfidence note: overconfidence note vs. 
no overconfidence note) x 2 (forewarning: forewarning vs. no forewarning) ANOVA, with 
expertise as a within-factor and overconfidence note and forewarning as between-factors.   
In the low expertise task, the anchoring forewarning was expected to reduce the 
anchoring effect irrespective of the overconfidence note.  In contrast, the anchoring 
forewarning was supposed to reduce the anchoring effect in the high expertise task only if 
confidence had been reduced by the overconfidence note prior to the forewarning.   
The anchoring effect was significantly higher than zero across conditions 
(M = 0.53), F(1, 75) = 68.02, p < .001, η²p = .48.  As predicted, the expertise x anchoring 
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 To minimize the disproportionate impact of outliers, a modified recursive outlier correction was 
used.  A modified recursive outlier correction is less sensitive to sample size and amount of skewness than 
other outlier correction methods (van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1993).  In a modified recursive outlier correction, the 
exclusion of extreme values below or above a certain cutoff criterion is repeated several times, until no 
extreme values remain or until the sample size of the restricted sample (including the temporarily excluded 
value) falls below four.  As recommended by van Selst and Jolicoeur (1993), a cutoff criterion of 3.5 
standard deviations was set.  Outliers were replaced with group means.  
 
6
Due to this transformation, higher z-scores always indicate stronger anchoring effects in the here 
presented studies.  Without the anchoring effect, the average z-score would be zero, because there would be 
no overall difference between high and low anchor.  For example, if an estimation on a low anchor item was 
located between the low anchor and the overall mean (anchoring effect), it was transformed from a negative 
to a positive z-value by a multiplication with (-1). 
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forewarning two-way interaction was significant, F(1, 75) = 9.50, p < .01, η²p = .11.  In the 
high expertise task, single contrasts showed no difference between the forewarning 
condition and the condition without forewarning (see Figure 2), F(1, 75) < 2.7, p > .11.  In 
the low expertise task, however, the anchoring effect was significantly reduced by the 
anchoring forewarning (see Figure 2), F(1, 75) = 7.20, p < .01, η²p = .09.  Deviating from 
my expectations, the interaction of expertise x overconfidence note x anchoring 
forewarning was not significant, F < 1.  None of the remaining effects reached 
significance, all Fs < 1.7.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Magnitude of the anchoring effect (z-values with reverse coded low anchor items) by expertise 
(low vs. high), overconfidence note (no note vs. note), and anchoring forewarning (no forewarning vs. 
forewarning).  Error bars represent standard errors. (Study 1). 
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Discussion 
Taken together, the results show that a forewarning on anchoring effects can be an 
effective debiasing strategy if expertise is low.  Differing from my expectations, the 
overconfidence note did not succeed in making the anchoring forewarning effective when 
expertise was high.  In a similar way, all self-report measures concerning the perception 
and consideration of the anchoring forewarning were not influenced by the overconfidence 
note. 
Possibly, the overconfidence note itself was not considered sufficiently by the 
participants because of their overconfidence, causing them to underestimate their own 
vulnerability to biases (Pronin & Kugler, 2007; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Pronin, 
Lin, & Ross, 2002).  If this reasoning is right, confidence cannot be effectively reduced by 
explaining overconfidence on an explicit level.  In contrast, an effective confidence 
reduction should work on an implicit level. 
 
Study 2 
In the second study, overconfidence should be reduced by ten difficult general 
knowledge questions.  The completion of difficult questions has been identified as a means 
to reduce confidence (Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994).  Again, experience was varied as a 
proxy for expertise by the same two estimation tasks as in Study 1.  As in Study 1, a 
2 (expertise: high vs. low) x 2 (confidence reduction: reduction vs. no reduction) x 2 
(forewarning: forewarning vs. no forewarning) x 2 (anchor: low vs. high) mixed design 
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with expertise as a within-factor and confidence reduction, forewarning and anchor as 
between-factors was applied. 
Method 
Procedure 
Participants completed an online questionnaire, which was designed with Unipark 
EFS Survey.  The procedure was similar to Study 1.  Again, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the eight conditions, and the order of the estimation tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants.   
Materials  
Expertise.  Participants worked on the same two estimation tasks as in Study 1. 
Confidence reduction.  Half of the participants received a treatment which was 
aimed at reducing confidence in their own decisions.  The confidence reduction consisted 
of ten difficult general knowledge questions (e.g., "How long is the Nile River?"; "What is 
the diameter of the moon?").  For these questions, participants had to estimate confidence 
intervals.  A reduction of confidence by difficult general knowledge questions has already 
been shown to be successful (Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994).  Nevertheless, a pretest was 
conducted to ensure the confidence-reducing impact of these tasks. 
Pretest of the confidence reduction 
In a pretest (n = 41), it was verified that confidence was reduced significantly by 
solving ten difficult general knowledge questions, whereas other potential confound 
variables remained unaffected.  More concretely, pretest-participants were asked before or 
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after answering the questions to rate (a) their general aptitude in making estimates, (b) the 
probability that their estimates may be inaccurate, and (c) their own capabilities to give 
exact estimates in comparison to others.  These three ratings measured the three facets of 
overconfidence defined by Moore and Swift (2011).  In a fourth question, participants 
were asked (d) how much they expected external factors to bias their estimates, which 
assessed one aspect of the bias blind spot (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002).  Participants’ 
ratings on (b) and (d) were reverse coded, because more confident participants were 
expected to be less conscious about giving inaccurate estimations and being biased by 
external influences. 
Pretest participants’ ratings were combined to a single confidence index 
(Cronbach’s α = .80).  This index was significantly reduced when confidence was assessed 
after answering the questions compared to assessment before the treatment [Ms = -0.30 
and 0.29 with and without confidence reduction, respectively, t(1, 39) = 3.84, p < .001].   
To control for other potential effects of the general knowledge task, the German 
version of the Multidimensional Mood Questionnaire (Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz, & 
Eid, 1997) was employed, which measures three bipolar scales (good – bad mood, 
alertness – tiredness, and calmness – restlessness).  Additionally, subjective frustration was 
measured with a supplementary question.  T-tests revealed no significant impact of the ten 
general knowledge tasks on any of the scales or their subitems, nor on my supplementary 
question, all ts < 1.3.  Hence, the ten difficult estimation tasks proved to be suitable for 
confidence reduction, whereas they did not affect participants’ mood, alertness, 
restlessness, or frustration.   
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Anchoring forewarning and anchor.  The anchoring forewarning and the anchor 
values were identical to those used in Study 1.   
Additional measures.  After each of the two estimation tasks, participants answered 
the same five questions about their subjective feeling of expertise as in Study 1.  At the 
end, participants again answered a short questionnaire.  Unlike in Study 1, participants first 
rated how much their own estimates might have been influenced by the two anchors, to 
measure how the confidence reduction changed the awareness about the anchoring effect.  
They then answered the same questions as in Study 1: the five questions about the 
perception of the anchoring forewarning and the awareness about the anchoring effect, one 
question about both their mood and alertness, general questions about specific incidents 
during the experiment and their demographic information.   
Participants 
115 participants (57 female, MAge = 26.3 years, SD MAge = 3.91 years) were 
recruited by approaching them on the university campus and asking them to take part in a 
study containing estimation tasks.  To ensure a low expertise level for the low expertise 
task (estimation of a company value), students of economics and financial mathematics 
were excluded from participation.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
experimental conditions.  Due to excessive acoustic disturbance, implausibly long 
completion times, repeated participation, or clearly deficient understanding of the 
instructions, five participants (4 %) were excluded from further analyses. 
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Results 
Manipulation check 
Expertise.  Data confirmed the assumption that participants would feel more 
confident about their estimations in the high expertise task.  The difference between the 
lowest and highest value which participants considered a possible estimate, was 
significantly wider in the low expertise estimation task
7
 (M = 1.02, SD = 0.52) than in the 
high expertise task (M = 0.39, SD = 0.18), t(1, 109) = 13.63, p < .001].  Furthermore, 
participants indicated (all scales ranging from 1 to 9) that they felt more certain in the high 
expertise condition [Ms = 6.07 and 3.02, SDs = 1.43 and 1.70, for high and low expertise 
respectively, t(1, 109) = 15.50, p < .001], rated their estimations as more thorough 
[Ms = 6.09 and 4.91, SDs = 1.37 and 1.39, t(1, 109) = 8.80, p < .001], felt more competent 
[Ms = 5.72 and 2.85, SDs = 1.52 and 1.54, t(1, 109) = 15.86, p < .001], and regarded their 
performance as superior in comparison to the average peer [Ms = 54.99 % and 44.08 % in 
percentages, SDs = 19.60 and 21.38,  t(1, 109) = 4.49, p < .001].   
Confidence reduction.  As expected, a confidence reduction should change how the 
anchoring forewarning is made use of, particularly in the high expertise task.  More 
precisely, in the high expertise estimation task, participants were expected to become more 
aware that their own estimates might have been influenced by the anchors.  In contrast, 
awareness about the influence of the anchors was not expected to increase significantly in 
                                                 
 
7
 As in Study 1, the difference between the lowest and highest value considered a possible estimate 
for each participant were divided by their estimates, to correct for the higher absolute values in the low 
expertise task. 
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the low expertise task, because it should be elevated in the first place as a result of low task 
confidence.  In fact, a repeated-measures ANOVA of bias awareness with confidence 
reduction as between-factor and expertise as within-factor revealed that in the low 
expertise task, participants were generally more conscious of the influence the anchor 
exerted (M = 5.95, SD = 2.38), as opposed to the high expertise task (M = 4.95, 
SD = 2.20), F(1, 108) = 12.38, p < .001].  More importantly, a significant interaction 
between task expertise and confidence reduction occurred [F(1, 108) = 5.44, p = .02].  As 
expected, single contrasts show that the confidence reduction failed to moderate awareness 
of the influence of the anchor in the low expertise task [Contrast confidence reduction 
(reduction vs. no reduction): F < 1].  However, the confidence reduction significantly 
increased awareness about the influence of the anchor in the high expertise task 
[Awareness with confidence reduction (M = 4.48, SD = 2.16) vs. awareness without 
confidence reduction (M = 5.44, SD = 2.15), F(1, 108) = 5.45, p = .02]. 
Additionally, participants’ self-reports indicated that they considered the anchoring 
forewarning significantly more while forming their own estimates after the confidence 
reduction [Ms = 5.46 and 4.00, SDs = 1.94 and 2.01 with and without confidence 
reduction, t(1, 55) = 2.71, p = .01].  The confidence reduction did not have any significant 
effects on other self-report measures (influenceability by the anchoring effect, attitude 
towards being influenced by anchoring effects, mood, alertness), ts < 1.2. 
Magnitude of the anchoring effect 
The procedure of outlier exclusion, z-standardization, and reverse-scoring of low 
anchor tasks was the same as in Study 1.  The estimations for each expertise level were 
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submitted as repeated measures to a 2 (expertise: high vs. low) x 2 (confidence reduction: 
reduction vs. no reduction) x 2 (forewarning: forewarning vs. no forewarning) ANOVA 
with expertise as a within-factor and confidence reduction and forewarning as between-
factors.  As expected, the anchoring effect was significantly higher than zero across 
conditions (M = 0.54), F(1, 105) = 30.34, p < .001, η²p = .22.  Additionally, a marginally 
significant main effect of the anchoring forewarning was revealed.  Anchoring effects on 
all expertise levels were marginally stronger without a forewarning (M = 0.69) than when 
a forewarning was provided (M = 0.40), F(1, 105) = 3.78, p = .05, see Figure 3.  More 
interestingly, the expected expertise x confidence reduction x anchoring forewarning three-
way interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 105) = 3.5, p = .06, η²p = .03.  None of the 
remaining effects obtained significance, all Fs < 1.3.  To better understand this interaction, 
the two estimations (estimation of a company value and a flat rent) were separately 
submitted to a 2 (confidence reduction: reduction vs. no reduction) x 2 (forewarning: 
forewarning vs. no forewarning) ANOVA. 
Magnitude of the anchoring effect: company evaluation  
In the low expertise estimation task, the anchoring forewarning was predicted to 
reduce the anchoring effect irrespective of the confidence reduction.  In accord with the 
hypothesis, a preceding anchoring forewarning led to an anchoring effect that was 
marginally weaker (M = 0.40) than without the forewarning (M = 0.69), F(1, 106) = 3.39, 
p = .07, η²p = .03, see Figure 3.  
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Magnitude of the anchoring effect: flat rent  
In the high expertise estimation task, the anchoring forewarning should reduce the 
anchoring effect only if confidence is reduced before the forewarning.  Accordingly, the 
expected two-way interaction between confidence reduction and anchoring forewarning 
occurred, F(1, 106) = 4.30, p = .04, η²p = .04, see Figure 3.  Single contrasts show that the 
anchoring forewarning failed to moderate the anchoring effect without a preceding 
confidence reduction in the high expertise task, F < 1.  However, the anchoring effect is 
significantly moderated by an anchoring forewarning after a confidence reduction in the 
high expertise task, F(1, 106) = 4.50, p = .04, η²p = .04. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Magnitude of the anchoring effect (combined z-values with reverse coded low anchor items) by 
expertise (low vs. high), confidence reduction (no reduction vs. reduction), and forewarning (no forewarning 
vs. forewarning).  Error bars represent standard errors. (Study 2). 
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In the high expertise task, the combination of the confidence reduction and the 
forewarning led to an anchoring effect that did not differ significantly from zero, t < 1, 
whereas in all other conditions, the anchoring effect was significantly higher than zero, all 
ts > 8.55, all ps < .001. 
Discussion 
First, Study 2 shows that a forewarning on anchoring effects can be an effective 
debiasing strategy if expertise is low.  Moreover, if expertise is high, a forewarning can 
also reduce and even undo anchoring, given that confidence has initially been lowered.  
The effectiveness of a forewarning following the confidence reduction in the high 
expertise task indicates that excessive confidence may in fact be the reason why 
participants do not correct.  As opposed to the explicit confidence reduction attempt in 
Study 1, the implicit method applied in Study 2 proved to be successful. 
Self-report measures support this reasoning.  As expected, confidence measures 
after the estimation tasks were significantly higher in the high expertise task.  Additionally, 
participants experience a stronger influence of the anchor value and consider the anchoring 
forewarning to a further degree if confidence is initially reduced in a high expertise setting.  
In a low expertise setting, these effects did not appear.  This empirical evidence supports 
my hypothesis that lacking awareness about one’s own susceptibility to biases constitutes a 
reason for the failure of forewarnings in high expertise decision making.   
Although the pretest showed that the confidence reduction lowered confidence 
levels as intended, while frustration, mood, as well as alertness were not influenced by the 
manipulation, a risk of another confounded variable still remains, namely fatigue.  
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Whereas participants in the confidence reduction condition had to work on ten difficult 
general knowledge questions, participants in the control group continued without a 
comparable task.  Furthermore, my findings are only based on two specific estimation 
tasks.  In the next study, I therefore used a different confidence reduction with a similarly 
effortful control treatment, as well as different estimation tasks.   
 
Study 3 
Having obtained first support for the hypothesis that heightened confidence is 
indeed a factor which hinders expert decision makers to eliminate anchoring effects after a 
forewarning, I aimed at replicating these findings of Study 2 with other confidence 
reduction methods and a different set of estimation tasks.    
As in Study 2, I applied a 2 (expertise: high vs. low) x 2 (confidence reduction: 
reduction vs. no reduction) x 2 (forewarning: forewarning vs. no forewarning) x 2 (anchor: 
low vs. high) mixed design with expertise as a within-factor and confidence reduction, 
forewarning and anchor as between-factors. 
Method 
Procedure 
Participants completed an online questionnaire, which was designed with Unipark 
EFS Survey.  The procedure was similar to Study 2.  Again, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the eight conditions, and the order of the estimation tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants.   
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Materials 
 Expertise.  Again, expertise was varied, but as opposed to Studies 1 and 2, each 
participant worked not only on one, but on two tasks for which she or he had a lot of 
experience and on two tasks in far less familiar domains.   
One of the high expertise tasks was the same as in Study 2 and included the 
estimation of a shared flat rent in Cologne.  In the second high expertise task, participants 
estimated the average lunch expenses of a student in the local university canteen.  The 
most important characteristics determining the money spent for lunch (e.g., types of food, 
additional drinks) were described.  As most of the students in Cologne eat in the university 
canteen quite regularly, they are experienced with this estimation.  Likewise, one of the 
low expertise tasks was similar to that used in Study 2, requiring the estimation of a 
company value.  In the second low expertise task, participants estimated the number of gas 
stations in Germany, which was designed as a task they had not been confronted with 
before.  The task also provided a description of the most important characteristics 
determining the number of gas stations (e.g., population in Germany, number of cars in 
Germany).  
Confidence reduction.  Different to Study 2, confidence was reduced by letting 
participants experience their own fallibility.  Similar to Arkes et al. (1987), participants 
were asked seemingly “easy” general knowledge questions and received feedback about 
the correct responses.  The questions appeared to be easy but contained hidden difficulties. 
For instance, participants were asked whether the carnival event "Mardi Gras" is 
celebrated in Rio de Janeiro or in New Orleans.  As carnival is often associated with Rio 
de Janeiro, participants feel confident that Rio is the right answer, even though New 
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Orleans is the actual solution.  After receiving feedback about the correct responses, 
participants were expected to feel that they overestimated their own ability to identify the 
correct answer (Arkes et al., 1987). 
In the control condition, the questions appeared to be and were in fact difficult 
(Arkes at al., 1987).  One question, for instance, read as follows: What is the highest 
volcano on earth, Ojos del Salado or Guallatiri? Like in the experimental condition, 
participants were informed about the actually correct responses after completing the five 
tasks.  However, these participants should not realize that they overestimated their 
knowledge because they already knew about the difficulties of the responses when they 
answered. 
  Pretest of the confidence reduction 
The general knowledge questions of Arkes et al. (1987) were designed for an 
American sample and both the perceived and actual difficulty of most questions would 
differ for German participants.  I therefore conducted a pretest with twenty new questions 
to identify five seemingly easy questions with hidden difficulties for the experimental 
condition, and five questions matching in apparent and actual complexity for the control 
condition.  In the questions which were finally used in Study 3, participants rated the five 
questions in the experimental condition as significantly easier than those used in the 
control condition [Ms = 4.5 and 7.3 respectively, on a nine point scale, t(1, 164) = 16.7, 
p < .001].  As intended, the difficulty (number of correct responses) of the questions was 
constant in both groups [Ms = 2.7 and 2.8 with and without hidden difficulties, 
t(1, 164) = 0.9, p = .38].  
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Anchoring forewarning.  Half of the participants received the same anchoring 
forewarning as in Studies 1 and 2.   
Anchor.  As in Studies 1 and 2, participants first answered a comparative question 
and then provided an absolute estimate.  One of the high expertise tasks always included a 
high anchor (420 € for the shared flat rent and 6 € for the money spent for lunch), the other 
one a low anchor (220 € for the shared flat rent and 3 € for the money spent for lunch).  
Similarly, one of the low expertise tasks always included a high anchor (100 billion € for 
the estimation of a company value and 550,000 for the number of gas stations), while the 
other one included a low anchor (4 billion € for the estimation of a company value and 
5000 for the number of gas stations).  The order of the tasks was randomized.  The high 
and low anchor values were set at the 85th percentile and at the 15th percentile on the basis 
of different pretests (n = 57 for the money spent for lunch, n = 59 for the flat rent, n = 65 
for the company value, and n = 34 for the number of gas stations). 
Additional measures.  Due to high correlations of the four items measuring the 
subjective feeling of expertise in Studies 1 and 2, only one question assessed the 
experienced judgment certainty after each estimation task.  The same five questions as in 
Study 1 and 2 where administered to measure whether the confidence reduction changed 
the perception of the anchoring forewarning and the awareness about the anchoring effect.  
Because of the increased number of tasks compared with Study 2, it would have been 
difficult for participants to rate at the end of the study how much their own estimates had 
been influenced in each task.  For this reason these questions were excluded in Study 3.   
Additionally, three questions about each participant's general confidence level were 
introduced, which were asked in blocks after the second and the fourth estimation task: 
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Participants general aptitude in estimation tasks, their performance in such estimation tasks 
compared to other participants, and the probability of a hidden task difficulty.  Again, 
participants answered one question concerning their mood and one question about their 
frustration, general questions about specific incidents during the experiment, and gave 
their demographic data at the end of the study.   
Participants 
176 participants (114 female, MAge = 27.1 years, SDAge = 6.54 years) recruited from 
a pool for online data-collection were given the chance to win a gift voucher by enrolling 
in a lottery.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions.  
As in the preceding studies, students of economics and financial mathematics were 
excluded from participation.  Due to implausibly long completion times, repeated 
participations, and clearly deficient understanding of the instructions, ten participants 
(6 %) were excluded from further analyses. 
Results  
Manipulation check 
Expertise.  Participants felt more certain after finishing a high expertise task (M = 
5.95, SD = 1.13) compared to a low expertise task (M = 3.27, SD = 1.50) on a nine point 
scale, t(1, 164) = 23.17, p < .001.   
Confidence reduction.  Again, the confidence reduction was expected to change 
participants’ attention to the anchoring forewarning because of their increased awareness 
about their own susceptibility.  Correspondingly, they viewed it as marginally more critical 
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to be influenced by the anchoring effect if confidence was reduced before [Ms = 6.38 and 
5.83, SDs = 1.21 and 1.63 with and without confidence reduction on a nine point scale, 
t(1, 163) = 1.70, p < .09].  Different from Study 2, participants did not consider the 
anchoring forewarning more while forming their own estimates after the confidence 
reduction.8  
As expected, an index of the self-reported confidence measures which were 
assessed after the second task and at the end of the study (judgment certainty, self-
perceived competence, judgment quality of the participant’s own estimates compared to 
others: Cronbach’s α = .71) was significantly reduced by the confidence reduction [Ms =  
-0.15 and 0.19 (z-values) with and without confidence reduction respectively], t(1, 163) = 
3.21, p < .01.  In line with Studies 1 and 2, all other self-report measures (the probability of 
a hidden task difficulty, mood, frustration) were not influenced by the confidence 
reduction, ts < 1.1. 
Magnitude of the anchoring effect 
The same procedures of outlier exclusion, z-standardization, and reverse-scoring of 
low anchor tasks as before were used.  Again, the two combined estimations for each 
expertise level were submitted as repeated measures to a 2 (expertise: high vs. low) x 2 
(confidence reduction: reduction vs. no reduction) x 2 (forewarning: forewarning vs. no 
forewarning) ANOVA with expertise as a within-factor and confidence reduction and 
forewarning as between-factors. 
                                                 
 
8
 The expected trend was observable, but far from being significant (p=0.22). 
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Across all conditions, the anchoring effect was significantly different from zero 
(M = 0.52), F(1, 139) = 232.99, p < .001, η²p = .59.  As in Study 2, a significant main 
effect was found for the anchoring forewarning.  Anchoring effects were reduced by the 
forewarning [Ms = 0.41 and 0.62 with and without anchoring forewarning, 
F(1, 162) = 8.83, p < .01, η²p = .05].  Unlike in Study 2, the ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of expertise.  The anchoring effect was weaker in the high expertise tasks (M = 
0.40) than in the low expertise tasks (M = 0.62), F(1, 162) = 9.35, p < .01, η²p = .06.   
The expected three-way interaction of expertise x confidence reduction x anchoring 
forewarning was also significant, F(1, 162) = 4.77, p = .03, η²p = .03, see Figure 4.  
Additionally, the confidence reduction x anchoring forewarning two-way interaction was 
marginally significant, F(1, 162) = 3.75, p = .05, η²p = .02.  None of the remaining effects 
obtained significance, Fs < 1.   
Magnitude of the anchoring effect: low expertise 
In the low expertise estimation tasks, I predicted the anchoring forewarning to 
reduce the anchoring effect irrespective of the confidence manipulation.  Accordingly, I 
found a significant main effect of the anchoring forewarning in the low expertise 
condition, F(1, 162) = 5.43, p = .02, η²p = .03, see Figure 4.  When preceded by a 
forewarning, anchoring in low expertise tasks was weaker (M = 0.51) than without a 
forewarning (M = 0.73).  As expected, the two-way interaction between anchoring 
forewarning and confidence reduction and the main effect of the confidence reduction 
were not significant for low expertise tasks, Fs < 1.   
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Magnitude of the anchoring effect: high expertise  
In the high expertise estimation task, the anchoring forewarning was supposed to 
reduce the anchoring effect only if confidence had been weakened before.  In line with this 
prediction, a two-way interaction between confidence reduction and anchoring 
forewarning was found, F(1, 162) = 7.92, p < .01, η²p = .05, see Figure 4.  Single contrasts 
revealed that the anchoring forewarning failed to reduce the anchoring effect in the high 
expertise tasks without a preceding confidence reduction (F < 1), whereas it was 
significantly reduced by an anchoring forewarning after a confidence reduction, 
F(1, 162) = 11.95, p < .001, η²p = .07. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Magnitude of the anchoring effect (combined z-values with reverse coded low anchor items) by 
expertise (low vs. high), confidence reduction (no reduction vs. reduction), and forewarning (no forewarning 
vs. forewarning).  Error bars represent standard errors.  (Study 3) 
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In the high expertise task, the combination of the confidence reduction and the 
forewarning led to an anchoring effect that did not differ significantly from zero, t < 1.5.  
In all other conditions, the anchoring effect was significantly above zero, all ts > 3.80, all 
ps < .001. 
  
Discussion 
As in Study 2, key results are consistent with the assumption that expertise exerts a 
negative influence on the effectiveness of an anchoring forewarning due to experts’ 
excessive confidence.  In the low expertise tasks, the anchoring effect is reduced by the 
anchoring forewarning while the confidence reduction does not have any supplementary 
effect.  In the high expertise tasks, the anchoring effect is affected by the forewarning only 
if confidence is first reduced.   
In Study 3, the anchoring effect was significantly weaker in the high expertise 
condition than in the low expertise condition.  This result deviates from Study 2, but also 
from other results in the literature which showed similar anchoring effects for different 
expertise levels (Englich et al., 2006; Northcraft & Neale, 1987).  However, the result of 
Study 3 is not the first showing a reduction of anchoring effects in a setting with higher 
expertise (e.g., Smith, 2011; Wilson et al., 1996).  In view of the deviating results and 
argumentations, it seems likely that the effects of expertise on the magnitude of anchoring 
effects may vary due to specific features of the anchoring task (e.g., the amount of anchor-
consistent and anchor-inconsistent information available).  To examine the influence of 
expertise on the anchoring effect independent of specific tasks, it seems promising to 
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disentangle the confounding factors of expertise and the task itself by a between-subjects 
manipulation of expertise in Study 4.   
 
Study 4 
In the preceding studies, expertise was operationalized as experience and varied by 
the content of the estimation tasks, which were more or less familiar to the participants.  
On the one hand, this approach avoids some possible confounds which may occur if 
expertise is implemented by the often used method of comparing experts with non-experts 
(e.g., different age means of the two groups, different educational levels).  On the other 
hand, it seems particularly important to examine the anchoring effect independent of 
specific tasks.  Otherwise one cannot determine whether the weaker anchoring effect in the 
high expertise condition, which occurred in Study 3, is indeed caused by expertise itself, or 
by other characteristics of the estimation tasks.  Additionally, one cannot be entirely 
certain that experience is an appropriate proxy for expertise in this context.  It seems 
possible that only partial experience and “half knowledge” hinders the correction of the 
anchoring bias, whereas profound expertise does not hinder, but facilitates correction. 
 To extend the previous findings to the domain of real experts, I implemented a 
between-subjects manipulation of expertise in Study 4.  In this study I compared a group 
of economic experts to a group of non-experts.  Management consultants constitute a 
professional group that is often occupied with decisions and estimations in the world of 
economics.  I therefore expected them to dispose of more expertise than students and 
former students in economic estimation tasks.  As in Studies 1 to 3, this higher expertise 
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should increase their confidence and undermine the beneficial effect of an anchoring 
forewarning, if no confidence reduction procedure is applied prior to the forewarning.  
To verify my hypotheses, a 2 (expertise: high vs. low) x 2 (confidence reduction: 
reduction vs. no reduction) x 2 (forewarning: forewarning vs. no forewarning) x 2 (anchor: 
low vs. high) between design is applied. 
Method 
Procedure 
Participants completed an online questionnaire designed with Unipark EFS Survey.  
The procedure was similar to the above-described studies.  Again, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions and the order of the estimation tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants.   
Materials 
Expertise.  Unlike in the preceding studies, Study 4 manipulated expertise by the 
professional economic knowledge of two groups of participants.  All participants therefore 
completed the same four tasks which contained estimations of economic quantities.  Two 
estimation tasks were identical to Study 3: (1) An estimation of a company value and (2) 
an estimation of the number of gas stations in Germany.  In the third estimation task, the 
most important characteristics of a company (e.g., profit, industry cluster) were described.  
Participants then estimated the turnover of this company.  As operating with variables like 
turnover or profit is part of a management consultant’s daily business, their expertise was 
expected to be high.  In the fourth estimation task, participants estimated the accumulated 
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market shares of Mercedes, BMW, and Audi on the German automotive market.  Due to 
the fact that the automotive sector is very important for the German economy, and that 
management consultants are often faced with the calculation and estimation of market 
shares, they are expected to be experts in this task, too.   
In contrast, students and ex-students of disciplines other than economics and 
financial mathematics (who were excluded from participation) should not be familiar with 
such specialized issues (company turnover, market share, etc.) and their expertise should 
therefore be low. 
Confidence reduction and anchoring forewarning.  Confidence reduction and 
anchoring forewarning were identical to Study 3. 
Anchor.  As in Studies 1 to 3, participants first answered a comparative question 
and then provided an absolute estimate.  In all groups, two of the tasks included a high 
anchor (100 billion € for the estimation of a company value, 550,000 for the number of gas 
stations, 16 billion € for the turnover estimation, and 70 % for the market share), the other two 
a low anchor (4 billion € for the estimation of a company value, 5,000 for the number of gas 
stations, 1 billion € for the turnover estimation, and 30 % for the market share).  The order of 
the tasks was randomized.  The high and low anchor values were set at the 85th percentile 
and at the 15th percentile on the basis of different pretests (n = 65 for the estimation of a 
company value, n = 34 for the number of gas stations, and n = 23 for the turnover and 
market share estimations). 
Additional measures.  As time is a scarce resource for management consultants, 
and redundant questions would possibly have increased dropout rates, the number of 
questions in the first part of the questionnaire was further reduced.  Therefore, participants 
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answered only one question about the subjectively experienced judgment certainty after 
each estimation task, skipping the blocked questions after the second item.  Since dropouts 
are less critical after the key dependent measures, I added some questions at the last part of 
the study.  Here, I mainly assessed the extent to which the confidence reduction changed in 
how far the anchoring forewarning was used by the participants because of their increased 
awareness about their own susceptibility.  Participants therefore answered the same five 
questions about the anchoring forewarning and the awareness about the anchoring effect as 
in Studies 1 to 3.  In order to measure their confidence, participants rated their general 
aptitude in estimation tasks, their performance in such estimation tasks compared to others, 
and the probability of a hidden task difficulty.  Additionally, they indicated their general 
competence and expertise concerning estimation tasks and their general ability to make 
exact estimations.  Finally, like in Studies 1 to 3, participants were inquired about their 
mood and frustration, answered questions about specific incidents during the experiment, 
and gave their demographic data, followed by an assessment of their effort to give good 
estimates.   
Participants 
For the non-expert sample, 95 students and former students (68 female, 
MAge = 23.95 years, SDAge = 6.37 years) recruited from a pool for online data-collection 
were given the chance to win a gift voucher by enrolling in a lottery.  To ensure a low 
expertise level concerning economic tasks, students of economics and financial 
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mathematics were kept from participating.  For the expert sample, 64 management 
consultants (13 female
 9
, MAge = 26.7 years, SDAge = 9.02 years, mean employment time in 
economics = 3.6 years) were recruited via e-mail.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the experimental conditions.  Due to implausibly long completion times, repeated 
participations, and clearly deficient understanding of the instructions, 12 participants (8 %) 
were excluded from further analyses. 
Results  
Manipulation check 
Expertise.  As expected, management consultants felt significantly more certain (M 
= 5.13, SD = 1.10 on a nine point scale) than non-experts (M = 3.35, SD = 1.20), 
t (1, 138) = 11.93, p < .001].   
 Confidence reduction.  As the seven different confidence measures were highly 
correlated (perceived judgment certainty after each estimation task
10
, participants' general 
aptitude in estimation tasks, their performance in such estimation tasks in comparison to 
other participants, the probability of a hidden task difficulty, their general competence and 
expertise concerning estimation tasks, and their general ability to give exact estimations: 
Cronbach’s α = .81), I calculated one aggregate confidence index.  This index was 
                                                 
 
9
 Due to the fact that the mean age and the male-to-female ratio differed significantly between the 
two groups, I alternatively conducted the main analyses with age and gender as covariates. This did not 
change the pattern of results, so that these analyses are not reported here. 
10
 Different from Study 1 to 3, it was possible to include perceived judgment certainty after the 
estimation tasks in a confidence index, because expertise was manipulated between subjects. 
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marginally lower with the confidence reduction (M = -0.06, SD = 0.71) than without the 
confidence reduction (M = 0.08, SD = 0.82), F(1, 135) = 2.77, p < .10, η²p = .03.   
Correspondingly, personal influencability by the anchoring effect was also rated as 
marginally higher after the confidence reduction (M = 6.14, SD = 1.43) than without the 
confidence reduction (M = 5.58, SD = 1.41) on a nine point scale, F(1, 135) = 3.86, 
p = .05.  Unlike in Study 3, participants did not rate it more critical to be influenced by the 
anchoring effect with the confidence reduction than without the confidence reduction.11 
These inconsistent findings may possibly be explained by the position at the end of the 
questionnaire, which could result in increased variance because of tired participants and 
the delay between the confidence reduction treatment and the assessment of the dependent 
variables.   
All other self-report measures (mood, alertness, consideration of the anchoring 
forewarning while forming estimates, effort to provide good estimates) did not yield any 
significant effects, all ts < 1.02, ps > 0.33. 
Magnitude of the anchoring effect  
The same procedures of outlier exclusion, z-standardization, and reverse-scoring of 
low anchor tasks as in Study 1 and 2 were used.  The combined estimations of the four 
tasks of one expertise level were then submitted to a 2 (expertise: high, management 
consultants vs. low, students) x 2 (confidence reduction: reduction vs. no reduction) x 2 
                                                 
 
11
 The expected pattern was observable, but far from being significant (p=0.28). 
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(forewarning: forewarning vs. no forewarning) ANOVA with expertise, confidence 
reduction, and forewarning as between-factors. 
Across all conditions, the anchoring effect was significantly higher than zero 
(M = 0.53), F(1, 139) = 224.89, p < .001, η²p = .62.  As in Studies 2 and 3, the ANOVA 
revealed a significant between-subjects effect for the anchoring forewarning.  Anchoring 
effects across both expertise levels were stronger without a forewarning [Ms = 0.42 and 
0.64 with and without anchoring forewarning, F(1, 139) = 12.24, p < .001, η²p = .08].  
Similar to Study 3, but different from Study 2 a significant main effect of expertise 
appeared.  The anchoring effect was weaker in the high expertise tasks (M = 0.38) than in 
the low expertise tasks (M = 0.64), F(1, 139) = 16.34, p < .001, η²p = .10.   Apparently, the 
anchoring effect affected the management consultants to a lesser degree than student 
subjects.  The expected expertise x confidence reduction x anchoring forewarning three-
way interaction was also significant, F(1, 139) = 4.81, p = .03, η²p = .03.  To better 
understand this complex interaction, the combined estimations of the four tasks of one 
expertise group (students and management consultants) were separately submitted to a 2 
(confidence reduction: reduction vs. no reduction) x 2 (forewarning: forewarning vs. no 
forewarning) ANOVA. 
Magnitude of the anchoring effect: low expertise (students) 
In the low expertise group, the anchoring forewarning is expected to reduce the 
anchoring effect irrespective of the confidence reduction.  Correspondingly, results show a 
significant main effect of the anchoring forewarning, F(1, 80) = 8.77, p < .01, η²p = .10, 
see Figure 5.  When preceded by a forewarning, anchoring was weaker (M = 0.78) than 
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without a forewarning (0.51).  As expected, the two-way interaction between confidence 
reduction and anchoring forewarning was not significant in the low expertise group, 
F < 0.01.  Finally, there was no main effect of the confidence reduction, F < 1.4. 
Magnitude of the anchoring effect: high expertise (consultants) 
In the high expertise condition, the anchoring forewarning was supposed to reduce 
the anchoring effect only if confidence had been reduced prior to the forewarning. 
Accordingly, results show the expected two-way interaction between confidence reduction 
and anchoring forewarning, F(1, 59) = 4.1, p = .05, η²p = .06, see Figure 5.  Additionally, 
the ANOVA reveals a main effects for the anchoring forewarning [F(1, 59) = 4.35, 
p < .04, η²p = .07] and the confidence reduction [F(1, 59) = 4.76, p < .03, η²p = .08].  Single 
contrasts show that the anchoring forewarning failed to reduce the anchoring effect  
 
 
Figure 5: Magnitude of the anchoring effect (combined z-values with reverse coded low anchor items) by 
expertise (low vs. high), confidence reduction (no reduction vs. reduction), and forewarning (no forewarning 
vs. forewarning).  Error bars represent standard errors. (Study 4). 
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without a preceding confidence reduction [Contrast anchoring forewarning (forewarning 
vs. no forewarning) without confidence reduction: F(1, 59) = 0.16, p = .90] in the high 
expertise group.  However, the forewarning significantly reduced the anchoring effect after 
the confidence reduction [Contrast anchoring forewarning (forewarning vs. no 
forewarning) with confidence reduction: F(1, 59) = 7.93, p < .01, η²p = .12].  
In the high expertise group, the combination of the confidence reduction and the 
forewarning led to an anchoring effect that did not differ significantly from zero, t < 1.  In 
all other conditions, the anchoring effect was significantly higher than zero, all ts > 8.55, 
all ps < .001. 
Mediation analysis 
The results of the main analysis suggest that in the case of management consultants 
(experts), the effect of a confidence reduction on the impact of a forewarning relied on 
confidence ratings.  To formally test this mediation, I followed the bootstrapping 
procedure of Preacher and Hayes (2008), computing a confidence interval for the indirect 
effect (the path including the mediator, see Figure 6).  If zero falls outside this interval, 
mediation will be present.  To determine the confidence interval, I utilized the SPSS 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) macros of Preacher and Hayes (2012).  In this 
analysis, confidence reduction was the independent variable, while the magnitude of the 
anchoring effect was the dependent variable.  As the seven aggregated confidence 
measures and the three measures assessing the awareness about the anchoring effect 
(personal influencability by the anchoring effect, attitude towards being influenced by the 
anchoring effect, consideration of the anchoring forewarning while forming estimates) 
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were significantly correlated, r (59) = .28, p = .03, I used an index of these ten measures 
(Cronbach’s α = .85) as a mediator.  The mediator, therefore, does not only represent 
confidence levels, but also comprises awareness of the anchoring effect.  Results of this 
procedure revealed a 95% confidence interval ranging from −0.40 to −0.007.  The fact that 
zero did not fall inside the limits of this interval indicates a mediation effect.  This finding 
supports the view that the confidence reduction in a high expertise setting allows for a 
beneficial effect of the anchoring forewarning. 
 
 
Figure 6: Path coefficients for mediation in Study 4.  The coefficient in parentheses represents the direct 
effect of confidence reduction on the magnitude of the anchoring effect.  + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Discussion 
Like in Studies 1 to 3, results confirm my assumption that expertise exerts a 
negative influence on the effect of an anchoring forewarning because of experts’ excessive 
confidence.  Non-experts were able to correct for the bias after the forewarning 
irrespective of the confidence reduction.  Experts, on the other hand, only profited from a 
forewarning if their initial confidence was reduced.  In this condition, the anchoring effect 
was not statistically significant anymore. 
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Self-report ratings give further support for my reasoning.  As in Studies 2 and 3, 
confidence ratings were significantly elevated in the high expertise condition.  The 
confidence reduction significantly lowered these confidence ratings.  The important 
influence of confidence on the impact of anchoring forewarnings was also apparent in the 
mediation analysis.  Results demonstrated that the amount of confidence and awareness 
about the anchoring effect is the mediator driving the success of an anchoring forewarning.  
Further evidence comes from participants rating their own influenceability by the 
anchoring effect higher after the confidence reduction.  This corroborates the assumption 
that people may be more aware about their own susceptibility to the anchoring effect after 
a confidence reduction.
 58 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Significance of the present findings  
Common sense makes us assume that experts should be less prone to the risks of 
irrational biases.  As explained previously, there are also more substantial reasons to 
believe that experts should be better able to correct for judgmental biases such as the 
anchoring effect than non-experts.  First, experts should correct more efficiently because 
they have more anchor-inconsistent information available (c.f., Englich, 2008), which can 
reduce anchoring effects (Mussweiler et al., 2000).  Second, higher levels of expertise limit 
the range of responses considered as plausible and therefore may reduce the anchoring 
effect.  Third, experts may also be more aware of the direction and magnitude of a 
potential bias due to their broader and more profound knowledge in their specific domain 
of expertise.   
As laid out before, experts are generally more overconfident than non-experts (e.g., 
Englich et al., 2006; Törngren & Montgomery, 2004).  Such heightened confidence might 
hinder experts from listening carefully to forewarnings on their own influenceability, such 
as, forewarnings about anchoring effects (Wilson et al., 1996).  In a similar vein, people 
with higher expertise tend to neglect helpful decision aids (Arkes et al., 1986).  Thus, 
excessively confident experts may fail to correct their estimates following an anchoring 
forewarning.   
In line with this reasoning, the results of four successive studies demonstrated that 
an anchoring forewarning merely consisting of information on the existence and 
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robustness of the anchoring effect can be a successful correction strategy for the 
specifically robust anchoring effects of externally provided numerical standards.  Even 
more importantly, they repeatedly demonstrate that for experts, a confidence reduction is a 
necessary prerequisite to enable them to benefit from an anchoring forewarning (Studies 2 
to 4).  If experts’ confidence in their own decisions was not reduced, experts did not 
benefit from an anchoring forewarning, whereas non-experts did gain such benefit. 
Additionally, for management consultants who received a forewarning, an aggregate of 
confidence and awareness mediated the effect of the confidence reduction on the 
magnitude of anchoring (Study 4).  This finding supports our reasoning about heightened 
confidence as the reason for the failure of the anchoring forewarning in reducing anchoring 
in the high expertise conditions. 
My findings offer several key contributions to the judgmental anchoring, expertise, 
and overconfidence literature.  For the first time, a successful correction of experimenter-
provided anchors by a general debiasing method could be shown, and replicated, in a 
standard anchoring paradigm.  In self-generated anchor paradigms, the anchoring effect 
has repeatedly been reduced by measures such as forewarnings (Epley & Gilovich, 2005) 
or incentives (Epley & Gilovich, 2005).  In contrast, in an experimenter-provided standard 
anchoring paradigm, general debiasing methods such as forewarnings or incentives have 
been repeatedly shown to fail in reducing anchoring (Epley & Gilovich, 2005; Wilson et 
al., 1996).  Only specific strategies like considering-the-opposite (Mussweiler et al., 2000) 
or incentives under the condition of the direction of adjustment being evident (Simmons et 
al., 2010) have been successful.  However, in these studies, it was ensured either that 
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anchor-inconsistent knowledge was activated (Blankenship et al., 2008; Galinsky & 
Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler et al., 2000) or that participants knew about the direction of 
the adjustment (Simmons et al., 2010).  Consequently, the current research is the first to 
demonstrate the correction of the anchoring effect in a standard anchoring paradigm 
without support of the experimenter.  This finding is particularly important for applied 
contexts, in which it is often unrealistic to give support that is specific to a certain task.  
Second, the here presented studies are the first research to systematically examine 
the impact of expertise on the effectiveness of a forewarning.  Although previous research 
has consistently supported the vulnerability of experts to anchoring effects (Englich et al., 
2006; Northcraft & Neale, 1987) as well as to other decision biases (e.g., Guthrie, 
Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001), it has not previously been shown how expertise affects the 
different stages of the debiasing process.  My results demonstrate that expertise can be a 
double-edged sword for the risk of falling prey to the anchoring effect.  On the one hand, 
the anchoring effect was weaker in the high expertise condition (Studies 3 & 4).  This 
suggests that higher expertise can have direct beneficial effects on the susceptibility to 
anchoring effects.  On the other hand, my results show that experts did not benefit from 
anchoring forewarnings without an additional reduction of confidence.  This ambivalence 
might hold true for other biases as well. 
Third, my results advance our understanding of why forewarnings and other 
debiasing attempts are often so surprisingly ineffective.  As far as my research suggests, 
this is due to heightened confidence, which may prevent people from using information 
given in the forewarning.  Although I only show this for the domain of anchoring effects, 
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examining whether this also holds for other biases would appear to be a promising 
approach, because heightened confidence is likely to affect the openness to bias 
forewarnings in general. 
In the following, I first discuss a possible alternative explanation of my findings.  
Afterwards, I elaborate on the relation of my results to previous research in this field.  In 
the then following part, I propose directions for future research.  Finally, I suggest 
practical implications resulting from my findings. 
 
Alternative explanation: Intentional usage of the anchor value 
Subjects who anticipate the experimenter to be maximally informative may infer 
that the provided anchor value is close to the true value (Jacowitz & Kahnemann, 1995; 
Schwarz, 1994).  Non-experts may be more open to seeing the randomly generated anchor 
value as informative, because they possibly simply do not know the answer and therefore 
intentionally use the anchor value as information.  This process could explain why 
anchoring was stronger for non-experts than for experts in Studies 3 and 4.  If the anchor is 
intentionally used as information, this may add to the other mechanisms of anchoring and 
cause a stronger anchoring effect in the low expertise condition.   
Moreover, if information is used intentionally, one should be more aware of the 
influence of information.  Awareness makes it easier to correct an influence (Strack & 
Hannover, 1996).  It is hence plausible that preventing the intentional usage of the anchor 
is easier than reducing the amount of the anchoring effect caused by unintentional 
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processes (numerical anchoring, insufficient adjustment, selective activation of 
information, or scale distortion).  Based on this reasoning, one would predict the pattern 
which occurred in the conditions without confidence reduction: The forewarning should be 
more effective for non-experts than for experts, because a larger proportion of non-experts’ 
anchoring effect could be caused by intentional usage of the anchor and could therefore be 
easier to correct.  
However, in the confidence reduction conditions, a forewarning successfully 
reduced experts’ anchoring effects in my studies, whereas it did not have a beneficial 
impact for non-experts.  If the success of the forewarning was only driven by the amount 
of intentional usage of the anchor, the success in the high expertise condition necessarily 
has to be explained by less intentional usage of the anchor after the confidence reduction.  
The reduction procedure in Studies 3 and 4 is indeed likely to make subjects alert to the 
risk of using irrelevant information which seems relevant at first glance.  But, this 
reasoning cannot explain why the confidence reduction had no effect in the low expertise 
condition.  In contrast, in the low expertise condition, one would expect a stronger effect 
of the confidence reduction because of more intentional usage of information without 
confidence reduction.  Intentional usage of information can therefore not explain why a 
confidence reduction did not have any effect on the magnitude of non-experts’ anchoring 
effect. 
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Relation to previous research 
Compatibility with previous research showing a failure of forewarnings 
At first glance, one may assume that my findings contradict the results of Wilson et 
al. (1996) as well as Epley and Gilovich (2005).  Here, a forewarning failed to reduce 
anchoring in an experimenter-provided anchoring paradigm even with a non-expert 
sample.  However, this discrepancy can possibly be explained by the lower expertise level 
of my low expertise tasks in contrast to those used by Wilson et al. (1996) and Epley and 
Gilovich (2005).  In these studies, expertise levels were not varied.  In the study by Wilson 
et al. (1996), the only task consisted of estimating the number of doctors in the telephone 
book of the participants’ home town; in the study by Epley and Gilovich (2005), 
participants answered general knowledge questions such as "What is the population of 
Chicago?".  These questions are closer to participants’ daily experiences than an 
estimation of a company's value, because it is likely that participants have looked up 
doctors in the telephone book before, and have probably also received information about 
the population of Chicago at some point.  Therefore, my low expertise tasks (e.g., the 
estimation of a proper company value) represent an even lower expertise level.  If 
participants have very low expertise for an estimation task, forewarnings might be 
sufficient in reducing the bias. 
The effect of expertise on the magnitude of the anchoring effect 
 In Studies 3 and 4 of this dissertation anchoring was less pronounced in the high 
expertise setting than in the low expertise setting.  To date, a less pronounced anchoring 
General Discussion 64 
 
 
 
 
effect for higher expertise or more knowledge has often been shown for basic anchoring 
(e.g., Englich, 2008; Kaustia et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 1996).  In standard anchoring 
paradigms, Blankenship et al. (2008) and Mussweiler et al. (2000) showed that anchoring 
was reduced if anchor-inconsistent knowledge was administered before the anchoring task.  
Nevertheless, the purposeful administration of anchor-inconsistent knowledge clearly 
differs from the comparison of high expertise and low expertise in my studies.  A 
successful reduction of the anchoring effect by learning relevant knowledge has recently 
been demonstrated even though this knowledge was not necessarily inconsistent with the 
anchor values (Smith, 2011, Studies 1 to 3).  However, respective findings differ.  Englich 
(2008) did not find a reduction of standard anchoring by providing knowledge prior to the 
anchoring tasks.  Even more importantly, in my studies, knowledge concerning the task 
was not learned during the experiment but differed from the beginning.  In other research 
in which initial levels of expertise differed, this did not influence the magnitude of 
anchoring (Englich et al., 2006; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Smith, 2011, Study 4).  Taken 
together, most of the research with similar methods as in this dissertation finds no effect of 
expertise on the magnitude of anchoring, whereas I found such an effect in two of the four 
studies. 
  An explanation for the deviating results of the latter studies and my own research 
might lie in the extent to which expertise varies.  In support of this reasoning, an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between expertise and hindsight bias has been proposed (Knoll, 
2010).  More specifically, hindsight bias was exacerbated by expertise up to a certain level.  
After reaching this level hindsight bias was reduced by expertise.  If a similar pattern also 
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occurs for the anchoring effect, this can result in different effects of a variation of expertise 
depending on the absolute level of expertise.  For example, Englich et al. (2006) compared 
experts in criminal law and experts in other fields of law concerning the strength of the 
anchoring effect in a task in which participants estimated an appropriate sentencing 
demand in a shoplifting case.  Although knowledge of experts in criminal law is clearly 
superior, experts in other domains of law were also somewhat familiar with criminal cases 
because they are lawyers.  Comparably, the expert sample recruited by Northcraft and 
Neale (1987), namely real estate agents, were clearly competent in estimating the value of 
real estate.  But, in contrast to my research, at least a proportion of their student reference 
group was probably familiar with real estate transactions, too.  Accordingly, 14.6% of the 
students reported that they had already been involved in a real estate transaction.  As their 
average age was twenty-two years, and they had probably lived at their parents’ homes for 
most of their lives, it seems likely that an even higher percentage were informed about the 
prices of real estate transactions without direct involvement.  Taken together, in both 
studies cited, experts were compared with "semi-experts", which might have caused the 
identical anchoring effects across groups.  
 By contrast, an intended goal of my research was to vary expertise to a large extent 
in order to study the moderation of expertise levels on the effects of an anchoring 
forewarning.  Therefore, it is far less likely that students in my studies were familiar with 
the included topics (e.g., estimation of a company value or turnover estimations), whereas 
management consultants are very familiar with these topics.  Possibly, only this 
pronounced difference of expertise in conjunction with the consequent high statistical 
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power is able to show the effects of expertise on the strength of the anchoring effect.  
Lower statistical power could also explain why these effects did not occur in Studies 1 and 
2, because they involved fewer participants and fewer estimation tasks.   
Furthermore, a different level of subjectivity could explain the deviating results of 
my own research and the studies of Englich et al. (2006) and Northcraft and Neale (1987).  
Whereas my tasks (e.g., the calculation of an adequate value of a company) require more 
conceptual problem-solving, such as rough estimations, a sentencing requirement is more 
dependent on the subjective attitudes of a judge (Hogarth, 1971; Partridge & Eldridge, 
1974).  Although this contrast is probably less pronounced between my tasks and the 
estimation of the value of real estate, the latter is in a way still dependent on subjective 
preferences (one person prefers to live downtown, while another person prefers a calm 
location in a suburb).  Possibly, this subjectivity of the estimations allows more selective 
activation of available anecdotal memory content (which experts possess in particular) and 
therefore undermines the potentially positive effects of expertise (e.g., a narrower interval 
of plausible responses, more anchor-inconsistent knowledge). 
Implications for the debate on the mechanisms of anchoring 
The insufficient adjustment account predicts that the magnitude of the observed 
anchoring effect should vary with the extent of effortful thinking devoted to a task (Epley 
& Gilovich, 2001, 2005, 2006).  The extent of effortful thinking is most typically 
manipulated by incentives (Epley & Gilovich, 2005; Simmons et al., 2010; Wilson et al. 
1996).  But forewarnings are also seen as manipulations that trigger effortful thinking 
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(Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2005).  According to this reasoning, 
findings demonstrating the ineffectiveness of forewarnings in reducing the effect of 
externally provided anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2005; Wilson et al., 1996) are often 
interpreted as empirical evidence against the insufficient adjustment account (Chapman & 
Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2005). 
Different from this previous empirical evidence, Studies 1 to 4 of the here 
presented dissertation show that forewarnings are effective in reducing the effect of 
externally provided anchors under certain conditions.  One might argue that this finding 
may speak in favor of the insufficient adjustment account, which predicts that 
forewarnings should affect the magnitude of the anchoring effect.  Conversely, it may be 
an argument against other approaches (e.g., the selective accessibility model) that 
contradict the effect of accuracy motivation on the magnitude of anchoring (Chapman & 
Johnson, 2002; Simmons et al., 2010). 
However, the different explanations of the anchoring effect are mostly not seen as 
mutually exclusive, but as complementary (Epley & Gilovich, 2010; Mussweiler, 1997; 
Mussweiler & Strack, 1999, 2000; Mussweiler et al., 2004; Simmons et al., 2010; Wegener 
et al., 2010a, Wilson et al., 1996).  Consistently, the success of forewarnings to reduce 
anchoring in my studies is probably not a meaningful argument in favor of the insufficient 
adjustment account or against other accounts.  Rather, it might show that the insufficient 
adjustment account is able to explain a relatively large proportion of the anchoring effect 
in these specific studies.  In other studies with a different operationalization, this might be 
different. 
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Implications for the revised theory of anchoring and adjustment 
The revised theory of anchoring and adjustment attempts to overcome the 
distinction between self-generated and externally provided anchors (Simmons et al., 2010).  
The failure to reduce the effect of externally provided anchors by incentives and 
forewarnings is explained by the fact that people do not know about the correct direction 
of adjustment.  If they did, an increase of accuracy motivation should reduce the effect of 
provided anchors (Simmons et al., 2000).  This has been demonstrated, for example, by 
showing that incentives reduced the anchoring effect of implausible anchors, whereas they 
did not reduce the anchoring effect of plausible anchors (Simmons et al., 2010, Studies 3a 
& 3b).  As people should be more certain about the correct direction of adjustment if 
anchors are implausible, this is seen as empirical evidence in favor of the revised theory of 
anchoring an adjustment. 
In Study 4 of this dissertation, the effectiveness of a forewarning in reducing the 
effect of provided anchors in economic estimation tasks was compared between non-
experts and experts.  For experts, the same anchor value should be less plausible than for 
non-experts, because the former should have more experience and rules of thumb available 
to narrow the range of potential answers.  As non-experts and experts received the same 
anchors, one would expect that experts should be more certain about the direction of 
adjustment.  Because of this higher certainty, the revised theory of anchoring and 
adjustment (Simmons et al., 2010) would predict a forewarning to be more effective in the 
high expertise task than in the low expertise task.  However, my results demonstrate 
exactly the opposite pattern:  The forewarning was less successful in reducing the 
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anchoring effect in the high expertise task than in the low expertise task.  My results are 
therefore disparate to the revised theory of anchoring and adjustment.  Possibly, this 
contradiction can be explained by the use of different methods in the Simmons et al. 
(2010) and my studies.  Simmons et al. (2010) used a two-stage process.  The first stage 
consisted of anchoring tasks similar to those used in my studies.  In the second stage, the 
participants were informed about the possibility to revise their estimates and that they 
could earn points if their estimate was close to the true value.  This type of instructions 
may prompt participants to revise their estimates, because they intuitively consider it a hint 
that their initial number is wrong.  They may therefore intuitively modify their estimates, 
even if they do not know about the correct direction of their revision.  Such an intuitive 
modification in the correct direction but equally often in the incorrect direction, should not 
reduce the anchoring effect.  Supporting this reasoning, Simmons et al. (2010) could show 
that a reduction of the anchoring effect only occurs in this paradigm, if it is ensured that 
participants know the correct direction of an adjustment. 
In contrast, the forewarning in my studies just included information about the 
direction of the anchoring effect, but did not include a request to correct.  It is therefore 
less probable that participants, although ignorant of the direction of adjustment, intuitively 
modified their values.  Taken together, the effects observed by Simmons et al. (2010) may 
be specific to their method, which may prompt participants to revise their estimates 
without knowing the correct direction of adjustment. 
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Future directions  
Effect of expertise and confidence on forewarnings about other biases 
As overconfidence is a very widespread phenomenon (Moore & Swift, 2011; 
Plous, 1993), and there is no apparent reason to believe that my findings are unique to the 
domain of anchoring, they may have important implications for other biases as well (e.g., 
hindsight bias, confirmation bias).  More precisely, it seems likely that my findings on the 
influence of expertise and confidence on the effectiveness of forewarnings also apply to 
other biases.  Similar processes may make people refrain from correcting their judgments 
after a forewarning about other biases.  They may believe that only people in general are 
susceptible to the respective bias, but neglect their own susceptibility.  Consistent with this 
reasoning, people see the existence of many other biases much more in others than in 
themselves (Pronin & Kugler, 2007; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 
2002).  It might therefore be promising to assess the impact that confidence and expertise 
have on the effectiveness of debiasing measures in the context of other biases.  
High power as an additional source of overconfidence 
Recently, it has been shown that the experience of high social power leads to more 
overconfident decision making (Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky, 2012).  Social 
power is the possibility to influence others (De Dreu & van Kleef, 2004).  In research by 
Fast et al. (2012), the induction of high power, for instance by an episodic recall task, led 
to overconfident decisions with monetary losses for the powerful.  In this process, 
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objective power only produces overconfident decision making if it leads to a subjective 
feeling of power (Fast et al., 2012, Studies 4 & 5).  
As I am able to show that heightened confidence exerts detrimental effects on the 
effectiveness of forewarnings, it seems plausible to assume that the experience of power 
(which leads to overconfidence) may also reduce the effectiveness of forewarnings.  This 
may further exacerbate the risk that professional decision makers like politicians or 
managers will not correct their decisions after forewarnings, because they are not only 
experts but also experience high power.  The experience of coming to an important 
decision affecting a large number of people may induce a feeling of power.  If this 
reasoning holds true, this would lead to the dangerous tendency that the more important a 
decision is, the less decision makers will correct it for decision biases.  It therefore seems 
important to examine whether higher power does, in fact, exert a detrimental influence on 
forewarnings in particular or debiasing measures in general. 
Additionally, it has been shown that the experience of power elicited by power 
gestures increases confirmatory information processing (Fischer, Fischer, Englich, Aydin, 
& Frey, 2011).  Confirmatory information processing comprises biased assimilation (Lord, 
Ross, & Lepper, 1979) and selective exposure (Festinger, 1957).  Biased assimilation is 
defined as an overestimation of the relevance, quality, and importance of information 
which is consistent with one’s own point of view, as opposed to inconsistent information 
(Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Lord et al. 1979).  Selective exposure denotes people’s systematic 
preference for information which is consistent with their point of view (Festinger, 1957; 
Fischer, Kastenmüller, Greitemeyer, Fischer, & Frey, 2011; Lundgren & Prislin, 1998).  
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Anchoring, too, is often explained by selective accessibility (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999, 
2000a) or confirmatory search (Chapman & Johnson, 1999), according to which judges 
selectively search for and activate hypothesis-confirming knowledge about the judgmental 
target.  This definition of the process reflects the parallels between anchoring and selective 
exposure.  In both cases, consistent information is preferred – consistent with the anchor 
(anchoring) and with the judge’s point of view of the (selective exposure) respectively.  In 
view of these similarities, it should be examined whether the experience of power by 
power gestures also leads to more anchoring due to more anchor-consistent information 
processing.  
Overconfident or merely more confident? 
The term overconfidence implies an excess of confidence.  In most of the research 
demonstrating this excess, subjective ratings of confidence are compared to a correct 
response (i.e., an objective or empirical result) (Pallier et al., 2002).  For example, in order 
to measure overconfidence, people are asked to estimate how many correct answers they 
will give in a ten-item quiz (cf., Moore & Healy, 2008).  This subjective rating of 
confidence is then compared to the actual number of correct answers (explicit measure).  If 
people were objective about their skills, only random deviations between the subjective 
ratings and the correct response, but no systematic difference should occur (Pallier et al., 
2002; Phillips, 1973).  Such a systematic difference, however, can be found in a multitude 
of situations, reflecting people’s tendency to generally overrate their performance (Moore 
& Swift, 2011; Pallier et al., 2002; see theory section for a more detailed overview). 
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In the four studies in this paper, participants were asked to give subjective ratings 
of confidence.  For example, they were asked to evaluate their ability to answer such 
estimation tasks (Studies 2 to 4).  However, there was no objective or empirical result 
implemented in my studies.  It is therefore not possible to calculate the exact difference 
between subjective ratings and an objective or empirical result.  In any case, results 
demonstrate that experts are more confident than non-experts.  Additionally, a confidence 
reduction makes an anchoring forewarning more effective.  Although I cannot clearly 
conclude the extent of overconfidence from these findings, they do provide an indication 
that heightened confidence of experts can be harmful and that a reduction can be helpful in 
reaching better decisions.  Based on this reasoning, experts’ unreduced confidence levels 
can be labelled overconfident because they led to inferior adjustment, even though no valid 
standard of confidence excess was present.  
In order to measure whether experts are indeed overconfident and not merely more 
confident than laymen, future research should additionally include an objective or 
empirical measure.   
Developing a better understanding of the underlying processes 
This dissertation focuses mainly on the benefits of effective debiasing measures for 
the applied context.  A significant contribution of future research might lie in achieving a 
better understanding of the underlying processes.  Earlier, I proposed that experts’ 
overconfidence undermines the beneficial effect of an anchoring forewarning, because 
overconfidence prevents them from noticing the bias at work.  According to the model of 
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mental contamination and mental correction (Wilson & Brekke, 1994, see Figure 1), 
awareness of the biasing influence is a necessary precondition for successful correction 
processes.  
My studies mostly provide evidence for the first part of my process assumption, 
namely that the success of an anchoring forewarning is mediated by the level of 
confidence.  First, the repeatedly significant confidence reduction x anchoring forewarning 
interaction in the high expertise settings demonstrates the impact of the confidence 
reduction, given that initial confidence is high.  In the low expertise setting, confidence did 
not have such an effect.  Additionally, the indirect effect in the bootstrapping analysis in 
Study 4 indicated that the effect of a confidence reduction on the impact of a forewarning 
was indeed mediated by confidence levels in the group of management consultants 
(experts).  Both facts argue for the causal role of confidence in the failure of forewarnings. 
However, my research provides limited insight of how the success of a forewarning 
depends on the awareness of the own susceptibility to the anchoring effect.  Although the 
term awareness may implicate measurability by explicit questions, the major problem lies 
in the distinction between awareness of the anchoring bias and the level of confidence.  
For example, if an individual indicates not being aware of the anchoring bias, this may 
indeed reflect ignorance of the bias, but it might just as well be a sign of overconfidence.  
My empirical results confirm that it is difficult to measure confidence and awareness of the 
anchoring effect independently.  For example, in Study 4, I found a significant correlation 
of confidence and anchoring awareness measures.   
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To attain a better understanding of the distinctive role of awareness of the 
anchoring effect, future research should strive to find a measure of awareneyy which is 
independent of the level of confidence.   
Ensure long-term effects of a forewarning 
For practical applications, for example in companies, it would be desirable if 
debiasing methods reduced biases not only directly after the usage of the method.  On the 
contrary, such methods should be able to reduce biases sustainably, because undertaking a 
debiasing method before each potentially biasing influence seems unrealistic.  A 
continuous monitoring of potentially biasing influences or the repeated application of the 
debiasing method by a company, for example, would probably be very costly with regard 
to time and organizational resources.  Since, to date, a durably successful reduction of the 
anchoring effect has not been demonstrated, research should strive to find such methods.   
In future research, it could therefore be promising to test if an anchoring 
forewarning continues to be successful after a delay.  This should be tested independently 
for different expertise levels, because the higher confidence of experts could hinder the 
positive effects of the forewarning. 
Additionally, the forewarning is a very short intervention, which is probably 
difficult to remember after a certain delay.  An improved memorization of the anchoring 
forewarning could make the forewarning more successful after a delay.  Memorization can 
be enhanced by repeated activation of this specific information (Anderson, 2000; Collins 
& Loftus, 1975) or repeated activation of information which is semantically related to this 
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information (Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975).  Consequently, to improve the 
memorization of the anchoring forewarning, one could ask participants to recall the 
forewarning after a certain delay, ask them to use the anchoring forewarning in other tasks, 
or train them to correct other decision biases which are semantically related to the 
anchoring forewarning.  Memorization can also be improved by making processing more 
elaborate (Craik, 2002; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Lockhart, 2002).  In this sense, providing 
information about related decision biases or teaching participants about the theoretical 
background of anchoring also seem to be possible interventions to ameliorate the 
memorization of the anchoring effect.  Future research should further investigate these 
options. 
 
Practical implications 
Confidence as a risk for experts’ decision making 
As decision makers like politicians or company executives are often experts in their 
fields, they may feel particularly confident.  Moreover, leaders’ historical success in their 
roles (Bassarab, 2011) and their high power (Fast et al., 2012) makes them particularly 
confident.  As a consequence, these experts are less likely to correct their decisions due to 
forewarnings.  The failure of forewarnings to reduce the effect of undesired influences is 
particularly dangerous because people often believe that they have the ability to resist 
biases by merely knowing about them (Wilson, Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002).  Moreover, it 
is one of the commonly used debiasing methods to forewarn experts about biases in order 
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to create awareness of their existence (Kaufmann et al., 2009).  My studies point out that 
this common belief is often wrong.  An anchoring forewarning is only effective in 
reducing the anchoring effect if expertise is low or confidence is reduced.  As 
overconfidence may indeed be found in many leaders and decision makers of the financial 
market, the findings of my study suggest one possible explanation why the forewarnings of 
Roubini (2007) and others could not help to prevent the financial and economic crisis in 
2007. 
Confidence should be carefully reduced  
A reduction of experts’ confidence has been demonstrated to make anchoring 
forewarnings effective in the case of experts.  Although heightened confidence obviously 
exerts negative influences in this case, one should not forget that although overconfidence 
may be a curse in this context, it can also be a blessing in other situations.  For example, 
overconfidence of managers drives innovation (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011), overconfident 
self-perception can increase outcomes in a team setting (Ludwig, Wichardt, & Wickhorst, 
2011), and managerial overconfidence and optimism can increase a company’s value, 
because rational managers postpone the decision for longer than is in the best interest of 
shareholders (Gervais, Heaton, & Odean, 2002).   Moreover, depressive realism stresses 
that depressed subjects are realistic and non-depressive subjects are overconfident (Alloy 
& Abramson, 1979, 1982; Vázquez, 1987; Von Helversen, Wilke, Johnson, Schmid, & 
Klapp, 2011).  Although this finding clearly does not allow the causal conclusion that a 
reduction of overconfidence makes people feel depressed, the co-occurrence of depression 
and reduced overconfidence should at least make us alert regarding possible negative side 
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effects of confidence-reducing measures.  To control for negative side effects of the 
confidence-reducing measures in this dissertation, I assessed mood.  In the here presented 
studies, the confidence reductions did not have any effects on mood.  
Involving non-experts in important decisions 
My findings show that non-experts correct the anchoring forewarning after a 
forewarning, whereas experts only correct with a supplementary confidence reduction.  As 
the anchoring effect appears in many applied situations in which experts come to important 
decisions, this may have severe consequences.  Additionally, as described above, there are 
reasons to believe that this may also be true for other decision biases.  One option to 
counter this risk could be an involvement of non-experts in far reaching decisions, because 
they are more open to forewarnings.  This idea supports positions in the recent public 
debate about lessons learned from the financial crisis, which actively promote more direct 
democracy and civic participation.  Important economic and political decisions should not 
exclusively be made by self-assertive experts (in their field), but should also involve the 
participation of non-experts, who might be more open to a critical view of their own 
capabilities.   
However, if an involvement of non-experts includes a group discussion, a critical 
issue needs to be addressed.  Research about group discussions has repeatedly 
demonstrated a tendency to focus on shared information and to exclude unshared 
information (e.g., Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; 
Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994).  This tendency could also be detrimental for a 
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beneficial involvement of forewarned non-experts in decisions.  They might possibly hold 
back their unshared viewpoint about the necessity to correct for cognitive biases in the 
discussion with experts.  A strategy to counter the focus on shared information is the 
assignment of group members to specific knowledge domains at the onset of the discussion 
(Stasser et al., 1995; Stasser et al., 2000; Stewart & Stasser, 1995).  It might therefore be 
crucial to inform experts and non-experts participating in the decision about the capability 
of non-experts to be more aware of cognitive biases, so that this strong point is appreciated 
and respected by all. 
To ensure that the involvement of non-experts in important decisions is in fact a 
promising strategy to reduce the anchoring effect, additional research should clarify 
whether non-experts can really prevail with their more critical viewpoint when interacting 
with experts and whether their self-critical tendencies indeed weigh out their inferiority in 
other aspects.
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CONCLUSION 
Biases have been a very popular field of research during the past decades and 
are attracting increasing interest in applied contexts (e.g., Kaufmann, Michel, & Carter, 
2009).  In contrast to this interest and the broad practical consequences, effective and 
applicable debiasing methods are scarce (Lilienfeld et al., 2009).   
The results of my four experiments show that for experts, forewarnings are 
ineffective in the case of anchoring without an additional confidence reduction.  As 
outlined above, it is likely that the reduction of other biases by forewarnings is also 
hindered by heightened confidence when the recipients of these forewarnings are 
experts.  Taken together, informing and forewarning experts about biases is obviously 
an often-used debiasing strategy (Wilson et al., 2002) that is not effective in the case of 
anchoring and may be similarly fruitless in the case of other biases. 
I am not only able to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of this widespread 
debiasing method in the case of experts, but also to offer measures to make 
forewarnings effective.  A reduction of confidence before giving the forewarning is an 
effective and feasible way to debias.  Through training interventions or even books, 
reducing confidence in a similar way and informing people about the anchoring effect 
or other biases would be easy to realize.  What do the reported studies reveal about the 
professional investors whose decisions may be biased by past stock prices (Mussweiler 
& Schneller, 2003)?  A simple warning may fail to overcome their excessive 
confidence.  Without reducing their overconfidence, the warnings directed at financial 
experts may remain unheeded, just like they did in the last financial crisis.
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